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BETWEEN THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
S.I. STRONG*
This Article investigates whether and to what extent a party must produce
an "agreement in writing" when seeking to enforce an international
arbitration agreement or award in a U.S. federal court. This issue has
recently given rise to both a circuit split and a petition for certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court, and involves matters offormal validity as well as federal
subject matter jurisdiction. The problem arises out of subtle differences in the
way an "agreement in writing" is defined in the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) and the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement ofForeign ArbitralAwards (New York Convention).
This is not just a US. problem, however. Questions relating to form
requirements under the New York Convention have also been much discussed
at the international level, with UNCITRAL recently issuing a formal
recommendation on how to deal with the problem.
This Article describes the scope of the current problems associated with
form requirements, including how inconsistencies in domestic practice affect
international commercial arbitration and global trade. After discussing the
difficulties in both the U.S. and the international sphere, the Article makes a
number of suggestions for legislative and judicial reform. This is the first
article to discuss the circuit split and associated issues in the context of the
FAA and to take a serious comparative look at the implementation of the
UNCITRAL recommendation at the international level.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. ........ 48
47
48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 47 (2012)
HeinOnline  -- 48 Stan. J. Int'l L. 47 2012
48 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
11. "AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING"-DIFFICULTIES AND DILEMMAS UNDER
U.S. LAW ................................................................ 52
A. Statutory Analysis........................................... 54
B. U.S. Case Law ............................................. 58
1. Cases Analyzed Under Article 11(2) of the New York Convention....... 58
a. Arbitral clauses or agreements ........... ................ 59
b. Exchange of letters or telegrams .................... 63
2. Cases Analyzed Under Section 2 of the FAA ........ ........... 65
3. Cases Analyzed Under Both Article 11(2) of the New York
Convention and Section 2 of the FAA ............. ........... 68
C. Conclusions Regarding the Form Requirement Under U.S. Law.............. 69
111. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REGARDING THE FORM REQUIREMENT OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION................................................. 70
A. International Interpretation of Article 11(2) of the New York Convention ... 72
B. International Interplay Between Article 11(2) and Article VII(1) of the
New York Convention ....................................... 74
C. UNCITRAL Recommendation ..................................... 78
D. The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law................ ......... 80
IV.FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. LAW CONCERNING FORM REQUIREMENTS ........... 82
A. Adoption of an Expansive Reading of Article 11(2) of the New York
Convention...................... .................... 84
B. Explicit Adoption of Domestic Legal Standards Through Reliance on
Article VII(I) of the New York Convention ......................... 86
C. Adoption of Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law .............. 89
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 91
1. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the term "agreement in writing" appears relatively easy to
define, apply and understand. However, as with most things in law, the task has
proven much more difficult in practice than in theory.
Indeed, U.S. federal courts have experienced a number of problems when
interpreting this phrase, which appears in article 11(2) of the 1958 United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more
commonly known as the New York Convention.' Not only is there a circuit split on
how to define the term itself, there are also growing inconsistencies regarding the
* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); J.D., Duke
University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The
author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England
and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center
for the Study of Dispute Resolution. This Article was drafted during a Visiting Fellowship at the
Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge (U.K.), and the author
gratefully acknowledges the kind assistance of the staff and fellows during that time.
1 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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proper relationship between article 11(2) of the New York Convention and the
various provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 2 that describe the need for
a written arbitration agreement in disputes arising under the New York
Convention.
In fact, certiorari was recently sought from the U.S. Supreme Court on
precisely this issue, stating the question presented was "the proper scope and
application of article 11(2) of the Convention, relating to when an arbitration clause
must be 'signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams"'
and noting a "split of authority" on this matter.' Similar questions have brought to
the attention of the Supreme Court several times over the last few years,
demonstrating an increased interest in this issue as well as the need for greater
guidance from the Court.' Given the Supreme Court's current interest in
arbitration, it is altogether possible that certiorari will be granted on this issue at
some point in the near future.
In the meantime, the confusion that surrounds the interpretation and
application of article 11(2) of the New York Convention has not only generated a
great deal of debate among scholars and practitioners,' but it has also led to a great
2 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2006).
See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
4 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., No. 08-65, 2008 WL 2773349, at
*i (U.S. July 14, 2008).
5 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. II; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Slaney v. Int'l
Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 00-1941, 2001 WL 34125352, at *18, 21 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (claiming
estoppel was insufficient grounds for meeting article II form requirement); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Int'l Oil Co., No. 97-409, 1997 WL 33549149, at *18-19 (U.S.
Sept. 8, 1997) (requesting interpretation of article Il's effect on non-signatories); see also Supplemental
Brief for Petitioner, Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen - Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London, No. 09-945, 2010 WL 3501249, at *7-10 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2010) (primarily involving
article 11(3), but noting issues relating to the intersection between article II of the New York
Convention and section 202 of the FAA); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l
Mktg. Strategies, Inc., No. 05-261, 2005 WL 2072285, at *i (U.S. Aug. 24, 2005) (noting the question
presented was whether the court of appeals had "improperly expanded federal subject matter
jurisdiction by going beyond the clear language of Section 202 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 202, and instead ruling that the court could 'craft' a 'general definition' from that statute as to
whether an arbitration award is 'domestic' and thus vests the court with jurisdiction"); Uzan v.
Motorola Credit Corp., No. 04-1255, 2005 WL 899480, at *22-27 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2005) (involving
choice of law issues affecting interpretation of article II).
6 Recent cases have included AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011),
Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010), Rent-a-Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010), Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009), 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.
Ct. 1456 (2009), Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009), and Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
For commentary in this area, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
580-619 (2009); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, Article 11(2) of the New York Convention and the Courts,
in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION, at 67, 68-81 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY];
Marc Blessing, The Law Applicable to the Arbitration Clause and Arbitrability, in EFFICIENCY, supra,
at 168, 172; Roman Chapaev & Veronica Bradautanu, International Commercial Arbitration in the CIS
and Mongolia, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 411, 425-30 (2006); Domenico di Pietro, Incorporation of
Arbitration Clauses by Reference, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 439, 439-50 (2004); Wilhelm Haarmann, The
Written Form Requirement for the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Germany, 15 IBA ARB.
NEWS 126 (Mar. 2010); Philipp Habegger, Extension ofArbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories and
Requirements of Form, 22 ASA BULL. 398, 403-05 (2004); Gerold Herrmann, Does the World Need
Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?, 15 ARB. INT'L 211, 215-16 (1999); James M.
Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration:
2012 49
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deal of litigation.' Disputes about the New York Convention's "form
requirements" are problematic for two reasons.
First, litigation is both expensive and time consuming for the parties. This
is particularly troubling when the dispute involves a highly technical jurisdictional
issue that is "unnecessary and instead serve[s] to frustrate commercial parties'
legitimate expectations and rights.",o Second, litigation regarding the application of
the New York Convention is inconsistent with the heightened need for
predictability in the resolution of international commercial disputes, a principle that
has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions."
Notably, the United States is not the only nation facing difficulties
interpreting and applying article 11(2) of the New York Convention.12 To the
contrary, the Secretary General of the United Nations has stated that:
[i]t has been repeatedly pointed out by practitioners that there are a number
of situations where the parties have agreed to arbitrate (and there is
evidence in writing about the agreement), but where, nevertheless, the
validity of the agreement is called into question because of the overly
restrictive form requirement. The conclusion frequently drawn from those
situations is that the definition of writing, as contained in [various]
international legislative texts, is not in conformity with international
contract practices and is detrimental to the legal certainty and predictability
Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. J. 469, 557-58 (2004); Neil
Kaplan, Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of
Step with Commercial Practice?, 12 ARB. INT'L 27, 30-35, 43 (1996); Susan L. Karamanian, The Road
to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 17, 67 (2002); Peter Kucherepa, Reviewing Trends and Proposals to Recognize
Oral Agreements to Arbitrate in International Arbitration Law, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 409, 412-14,
418-21 (2005); Toby Landau, The Requirement of a Written Form for an Arbitration Agreement: When
"Written" Means "Oral," in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONs 19, 25-33 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003); Dirk Otto, Article IV, in
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 143, 158-76 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT]; Andreas Reiner, The Form of the Agent's Power to Sign an
Arbitration Agreement and Article 11(2) of the New York Convention, in EFFICIENCY, supra, at 82, 83-
90; Dorothee Schramm et al., Article II, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT, supra, at 37, 73-94
(2010); Renaud Sorieul, The Influence of the New York Convention on the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 2 DISP. RESOL. INT'L 27, 39-41 (2008); Renaud Sorieul,
UNCITRAL's Current Work in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration, 22 J. INT'L ARB.
543, 543-44, 547-49 (2005); Vera van Houtte, Consent to Arbitration Through Agreement to Printed
Contracts: The Continental Experience, 16 ARB. INT'L 1, 2-15 (2000); Jing Wang, International
Judicial Practice and the Written Form Requirement for International Arbitration Agreements, 1 0 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 375, 376-81 (2001); Yongping Xiao & Weidi Long, Enjbrcement of International
Arbitration Awards in Chinese Courts, 25 ARB. INT'L 569, 570 (2009).
8 See infra notes 23-175 and accompanying text.
See BORN, supra note 7, at 580-81 (defining "form requirements").
i' Id. at 619.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); see
also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538 (1995); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974).
12 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), Working Grp. 11 (Arbitration), Preparation of Uniform Provisions on Written
Form for Arbitration Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, T 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.Il/WP. 139
(Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Note]; Landau, supra note 7, at 37-41.
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of commitments entered into in international trade."
The growing international inconsistency regarding article 11(2) recently led
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to develop
and adopt a recommendation regarding the interpretation and application of this
provision (UNCITRAL Recommendation). 14  Although the UNCITRAL
Recommendation has only been in place a short time and has not yet been
considered by a U.S. state or federal court, the Recommendation provides several
straightforward solutions to the interpretive problems experienced in the United
States. '
This Article therefore has a twofold aim: first, to identify whether there is a
problem with the manner in which U.S. law applies and interprets article 11(2) of the
New York Convention, particularly in light of international legal norms, and
second, if a problem does exist, to provide a realistic proposal for improving the
situation.'6 To that end, the discussion proceeds as follows.
First, Section II describes the current state of U.S. law regarding the
interpretation and application of article 11(2) of the New York Convention. 7 In so
doing, the discussion sets forth the text of both the New York Convention and the
FAA and discusses the ways in which the various provisions interact." The
analysis also introduces U.S. judicial opinions construing the New York
Convention and the FAA and discusses the various lines of precedent. 9
Section III then takes the Article into the international realm by
considering how other national courts and legislatures have addressed the New
York Convention's form requirements. 20 This portion of the analysis introduces the
UNCITRAL Recommendation and evaluates how that document affects the
interpretive issues facing U.S. and other courts.
Next, Section IV considers ways to address the problems experienced in
the United States and suggests a more cohesive and jurisprudentially consistent
approach to the form requirements reflected in article 11(2) of the New York
Convention.21 Section V then concludes the Article by wrapping up the various
threads of discussion and providing some final thoughts.
Having described the basic framework for analysis, it is time to begin the
substantive discussion. The first item to address involves current U.S. law and
13 UNCITRAL, Working Grp. 11 (Arbitration), Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning
Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection, Written Form for
Arbitration Agreement, Report of the Secretary General, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add.l
(Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinafter SG Report].
14 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding
the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. A/6/17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Recommendation].
15 See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; see also infra notes 245-323 and
accompanying text.
16 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
17 See id
1 See id; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2011).
'9 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
20 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
21 See id.
51
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practice regarding the interpretation and application of article 11(2) of the New York
Convention .22
11. "AN AGREEMENT IN WRITING"-DIFFICULTIES AND DILEMMAS UNDER
U.S. LAW
As it turns out, two types of difficulties exist with respect to the way the
United States interprets and applies article 11(2) of the New York Convention.23
First, problems arise with respect to the language of the New York Convention
itself.24  Second, complications arise when the language of the New York
Convention is brought into contact with the text of the FAA. 25 Both of these issues
26
are addressed below.
Before beginning, however, it is important to establish the boundaries of
the analysis. First, the following discussion focuses on a very narrow issue, namely
the interpretation of article 11(2) of the New York Convention and its application to
disputes arising in U.S. courts through the various provisions of the FAA. 27 The
question, as shall be seen, is a jurisdictional one rather than a substantive one.2"
Therefore, this Article will not discuss issues relating to the substantive validity of
an agreement to arbitrate, including the vast majority of issues regarding the rights




25 See id; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2011).
26 See infra notes 35-175 and accompanying text.
27 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202. A variety of motions
relating to the New York Convention can be brought in U.S. courts under the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 205
(involving motion to remove case from state court); id § 206 (involving motion to compel arbitration
or appoint arbitrators); id. § 207 (involving motion to confirm an award). Other motions can be
brought under the provisions of Chapter I of the FAA, using the "residual application" provision of
Chapter 2. See id. § 3 (involving stay of litigation); id. § 4 (involving procedural aspects of compelling
arbitration); id. § 7 (involving attendance of witnesses); id. § 10 (involving vacatur); id. § II (involving
modifications or corrections of the award); id. § 16 (involving appeals); id. §208 (involving residual
application of Chapter 1). The interaction between Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the FAA is discussed
below. See id.; see also infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
28 See Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (1lth Cir. 2004); BORN,
supra note 7, at 581 (distinguishing between form requirements that relate to the validity of the
arbitration agreement and those that are jurisdictional in nature); infra notes 82-104 and accompanying
text. Jurisdiction is clearly vested in federal district courts for disputes arising under the New York
Convention pursuant to section 203 of the FAA, but in many cases the issue to be determined with
respect to form requirements is whether the disputes in these cases are indeed "[a]n action or
proceeding falling under the Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 203.
29 Non-signatory concerns do arise in the following discussion, but only in a tangential manner.
Notably, U.S. courts have developed a wide variety of means of allowing non-signatories to participate
in an arbitration. See Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2003);
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995); BORN, supra note 7, at
1137-38. A number of these theories have been considered in international disputes as well. See
Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2010); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134,
145-50 (1st Cir. 2003). Although every state is different, comparative research demonstrates that most
states have adopted some means of binding non-signatories to arbitration. See BORN, supra note 7, at
1142-1205. Normally it is the signatory who attempts to bring a non-signatory into an arbitral
proceeding, but there are instances where the non-signatory wishes to rely on an arbitration agreement.
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899-1900, 1902-03 (2009); Sourcing
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Furthermore, the cases that will be introduced are for illustrative purposes
only and do not purport to reflect a comprehensive presentation of the nuances in
this area of law. Instead, it is sufficient for purposes of this Article to demonstrate
the existence and basic scope of the relevant problems, since certain new
developments in the international realm not only suggest a potential solution to the
difficulties faced by U.S. courts but may in fact require an altogether new approach
to form requirements in disputes arising under the New York Convention."
Finally, the following discussion will not consider issues relating to choice
of law, even though this there is considerable confusion in the United States
concerning the proper role of state law versus federal law in matters arising under
the New York Convention." However, domestic choice of law concerns may be
mitigated in this particular inquiry by the recognition that article 11(2):
deals exclusively with what has been termed as the formal validity of the
agreement to arbitrate. In particular, it does not deal with other, perhaps
more substantive, requirements. Under [article] V(1) of the Convention,
these substantive requirements may be appreciated in the light of domestic
law. In other words:
(a) formal validity of the agreement to arbitrate should be judged by
applying the unform rule of [article] 11(2) of the New York Convention
(unless domestic law is more liberal); and
(b) substantive validity of the agreement to arbitrate may, under [article]
V(1) of the Convention, be determined in accordance with national law.32
Furthermore, changes on the international front may make debates about
Unlimited Inc. v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2008); Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd.
P'ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1999). While these principles touch
upon issues relating to formal validity of arbitration agreements, there is no need to discuss the
underlying concepts in more detail than has been provided here.
30 See infra notes 245-323 and accompanying text.
31 Several issues affect this analysis. For example, the law governing the formation of an
arbitration agreement is arguably different than the law governing the validity of that agreement, at
least in the United States. See BORN, supra note 7, at 561 (noting that although most countries "apply
the same law to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement as to its formation and substantive
validity," the United States is the exception to the general rule). Thus, "some U.S. courts have held that
federal common law rules apply to issues of interpretation, but not necessarily questions of formation
and validity." Id. at 561, 1084-87. However, it is not always clear whether and to what extent courts
distinguish between those two issues. See I.K. Bery, Inc. v. Irving R. Boody & Co., No. 99 CIV 10968
SAS, 2000 WL 218398, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2000) (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9
(1987)) (concluding that state law controls the issue of whether an arbitration agreement is
enforceable); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concluding that the question was governed by federal law, including the New York Convention and its
implementing legislation, though noting that support existed to suggest that state law should control the
issue).
32 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 72; see also New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Schramm
et al., supra note 7, at 73, 88. Furthermore, choice of law debates can suggest-improperly-that the
proper task is to consider whether a contract has been concluded, when many disputes simply require
consideration of whether there has been "an exchange of letters or telegrams" for purposes of
establishing an agreement in writing under the Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 1,
art. 11(2); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting
narrowness of the analysis).
2012 53
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state versus federal law somewhat moot, at least with respect to the limited issues
under discussion in this Article." Therefore, this analysis will focus exclusively on
the interplay between form requirements under the New York Convention and the
FAA.3 4
A. Statutory Analysis
As always, analysis begins with consideration of the relevant statutory
authorities. In this case, two different enactments must be reviewed: the New York
Convention and the FAA."
Before beginning the textual analysis, it is necessary to resolve one
preliminary question about the scope of the New York Convention. In the past,
parties have occasionally argued that the New York Convention does not apply to
disputes involving arbitrations seated within the United States.36 However, that
position is patently contradicted by the plain language of the Convention itself,
which states that the Convention applies both to "arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought" (i.e., arbitrations seated outside the United States) and
"arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought" (i.e., arbitrations seated in the United
States but nevertheless considered to fall under the Convention as a matter of U.S.
law)."
The types of disputes that are considered "non-domestic" as a matter of
U.S. law are described in section 202 of the FAA." That provision indicates that a
U.S.-seated proceeding will still fall under the New York Convention if it involves
a non-U.S. party or has "some other reasonable relationship with one or more
foreign states."3 9  Therefore the New York Convention, including the form
requirements outlined in article II, can apply even to arbitrations seated in the
United States, so long as there is a sufficient factual basis supporting application of
the Convention.4 0
33 New developments in international law and practice might create a new, unified standard that
would eliminate debates about differences in U.S. state and federal law, at least with respect to the
matters at issue in this Article. See infra notes 245-323 and accompanying text.
34 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202
(2011).
3s See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 285-86 (3d
Cir. 2003).
37 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(1).
31 See 9 U.S.C. § 202.
Id. (stating the New York Convention applies to all arbitrations, wherever located, with the
exception of proceedings "entirely between citizens of the United States" that do not "involve[]
property located abroad, envisage[] performance or enforcement abroad, or [have] some other
reasonable relationship with one or more foreign states").
40 See China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 285-86. This is not to say that some courts have not
differentiated between U.S.- and foreign-seated arbitrations in other contexts. The primary debate
involves the question of whether a motion to vacate an arbitral award that is subject to the New York
Convention must be decided under international standards or domestic standards. See New York
Convention, supra note 1, art. V; 9 U.S.C. § 10. Some courts take the view that the New York
Convention does not impose any limits on the grounds upon which vacatur is allowed. See Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1997). Other
48:1
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Analysis begins with the New York Convention. The operative language
appears in article II, starting with subsection (1), which states that:
[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to subject to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.41
However, it is subsection (2) of article II that is the cause of all the
difficulties. That provision states that "[t]he term 'agreement in writing' shall
include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams."4 2 As shall be discussed
below, the first problem experienced by U.S. courts involves the consistent
interpretation of the language of article II(2).43
The second problem that arises in the United States is whether article
11(2)'s definition of an "agreement in writing" is applicable in situations where the
parties seek to compel arbitration as well as in actions to enforce an arbitral award.
Fortunately, that issue can be put to rest relatively easily.
On the one hand, article 11(2) is clearly relevant "at the outset of the dispute
between the parties, where one of them is seeking to enforce the agreement to
arbitrate pursuant to [article] II of the New York Convention."" Indeed, the
proximity of the definition of the "agreement in writing" to the twin mandates that
"[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing" (which appears
in article 11(1)) and that "[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this
article, shall ... refer the parties to arbitration" (which appears in article 11(3)) can
leave no doubt as to that conclusion.4 5
On the other hand, article 11(2) is not as clearly applicable to motions to
enforce an arbitration award.4 6 Certainly courts are recognized as exerting "control
over the form of the arbitration agreement . .. at the time of the enforcement of the
ensuing arbitral award, under the provisions of [article] V of the Convention.",7
However, applying article 11(2) to these actions requires a slightly more circuitous
approach to the text.48 This is because article V of the New York Convention does
not include any specific references to "an agreement in writing," although it does
courts take the view that parties may only rely on the grounds relating to non-enforcement under article
V of the New York Convention, even in actions to vacate an award arising out of an international
commercial arbitration seated in the United States, because such awards are considered non-domestic
under article I(1) of the Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. I, V; Indus. Risk
Insurers v. MAN Guetehoffnungshiitte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1140-41, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998); Lander
Co. v. MMP Inv., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 1997).
41 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(1).
42 id.
43 See infra notes 69-118 and accompanying text.
4 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 68.
45 New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(1), 11(3).
46 See id. art. 11(2).
47 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 68.
48 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
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make one reference to "the agreement referred to in article 11" in one of its seven
41subsection S.4
There is another alternative, however. Any action to enforce an arbitral
award under article V of the New York Convention must comply with the
procedural requirements of article IV(1).so That latter provision states that:
[t]o obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding
article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the
time of the application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy
thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified
copy thereof.
Numerous courts and commentators have held that enforcement
proceedings require parties to meet the requirements of article IV(1), which
incorporates by reference the standards for an "agreement in writing" reflected in
article 11(2). 2 Therefore, article 11(2) of the New York Convention applies to both
motions to compel arbitration and motions to enforce an arbitral award."
The third and final problem that arises with respect to article 11(2) involves
the interplay between the New York Convention and the FAA.54 The difficulty here
is that the form requirement contained in the FAA does not track form requirements
found in the New York Convention." This outcome is unsurprising, given that
section 2 of the FAA "has the dubious distinction of being the only still extant
legislative provision in a major trading state that is older than the New York
Convention's writing requirement. "1 However, understanding the historical
explanation for the textual discrepancies does not alleviate the problems
experienced by U.S. courts.
The problem is exacerbated by the FAA's statutory structure, which is
somewhat convoluted. First, the New York Convention is given domestic
49 Id. art. V(1)(a) (stating "[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred
to in article 11 were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made").
so See id. arts. IV-V.
s' Id. art. IV(1).
Id. arts. 11(2), IV(1); see also Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1291
(1Ith Cir. 2004); China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 287 (3d
Cir. 2003); Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI Int'l, Inc., No. 03-4165-JAR, 2005 WL
1118103, at *4 (D. Kan. May 10, 2005) (noting contrary reading would make article IV "superfluous");
Alvarez, supra note 7, at 68-70; Otto, supra note 7, at 159.
s3 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
54 See id.; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202 (2011).
5s See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
5 BORN, supra note 7, at 607 (referring to section 2 of the FAA, which appears in Chapter I and
was enacted in 1925 as part of the original federal statute on arbitration); see New York Convention,
supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
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application within the United States through section 201 of the FAA, which makes
article 11(2) directly effective in U.S. judicial proceedings. 7 However, the analysis
does not stop there.
Section 202 of the FAA states that "[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral
award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is
considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described
in section 2 of this title, falls under the [New York] Convention." 8 This reference
to section 2 invokes text and case law that are more commonly used for purely
domestic disputes under Chapter I of the FAA.5 9 This creates considerable
opportunity for confusion, which is made even worse by section 208 of the FAA,
which states that "Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under
[Chapter 2] to the extent that chapter is not in conflict with" Chapter 2 or the New
York Convention.60
If the structural complexities were not enough, additional problems can
arise as a result of the language of section 2 itself.6 ' That provision states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. 62
Obviously, the form requirements reflected in section 2 do not mirror those
in article II(2).63 While the FAA only needs evidence of a "written provision" or
57 See New York Convention, supra note 1; 9 U.S.C. § 201 (stating the New York Convention
"shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with" Chapter 2 of the FAA).
" 9 U.S.C. § 202. Section 202 does not stop there and with good reason, since Chapter 2 would
then encompass the entirety of disputes arising under Chapter 1. Instead, section 202 goes on to limit
the types of disputes to which Chapter 2 applies, stating that "[ain agreement or award arising out of
such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall
under the Convention." Id. This obviously returns a subset of disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of
Chapter 1. However, section 202 has one more clause, this one bringing some disputes that arise out of
a relationship entirely between citizens of the United States back within the fold of the New York
Convention. This will only occur if:
that relationship [i.e., a relationship entirely between citizens of the United States] involves
property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is
a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United
States.
Id. Thus, the end result is that Chapter 2 of the FAA applies to: (1) agreements or awards arising
between a U.S. and foreign party; (2) agreements or awards arising entirely between foreign parties;
and (3) agreements or awards arising entirely between U.S. citizens, but only if there is a sufficient
international nexus. See id.
s9 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2,202.
60 Id. § 208.
61 Id. § 2.
62 id
63 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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"an agreement in writing," the New York Convention further defines its "agreement
in writing" as "includ[ing] an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams."
Having set forth the relevant statutory regime, it is time to turn to case law
to see how U.S. federal courts construe these provisions. In particular, it is useful
to see how judges interpret article 11(2) on its own and how they handle the
apparent conflicts between the New York Convention and the FAA.
B. U.S. Case Law
U.S. federal courts have addressed a wide variety of matters involving the
form requirement of the New York Convention.66 Although it is possible to group
the cases by reference to their underlying fact patterns, as some commentators have
done,"7 this Article will approach the issue in slightly different manner, focusing on
the sources of authority relied upon by the court rather than the factual context in
which the disputes arise. Three categories of cases emerge: (1) those that construe
article 11(2) of the New York Convention without regard to the FAA; (2) those that
construe the FAA without regard to article 11(2) of the New York Convention; and
(3) those that attempt to harmonize the requirements set forth in both the FAA and
the New York Convention.6 ' Each line of cases is discussed below in turn.
1. Cases Analyzed Under Article 11(2) of the New York Convention
The first category of cases to discuss involves decisions that consider form
requirements exclusively under article 11(2) of the New York Convention. 69 That
provision states that "[t]he term 'agreement in writing' shall include an arbitral
clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained
in an exchange of letters or telegrams.""' Since courts often differentiate between
an "arbitral clause in a contract," "an arbitration agreement," and "an exchange of
letters or telegrams" and structure their analysis accordingly, this discussion will do
the same.
64 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. § 2.
65 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. § 2.
See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
67 See BORN, supra note 7, at 589-99.
See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
69 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2). Even those cases that are analyzed
exclusively under article 11(2) of the New York Convention may make passing references to the FAA at
times, but the analysis focuses on the terms of article 11(2). See Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine
Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
was made under section 203 of the FAA).
7o New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
71 See id
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a. Arbitral clauses or agreements
U.S. courts have construed the language relating to arbitral clauses or
agreements in several different ways. Indeed, the split of authority regarding this
issue has become so marked that it was brought to the attention of the U.S. Supreme
Court in a 2008 petition for certiorari.72
Several different questions exist. The first involves whether and to what
extent the parties must have signed the document(s) at issue. One method of
analysis is exemplified by the Fifth Circuit decision in Sphere Drake Insurance
PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc." That case involved an arbitration provision that was
found in a larger contract that was not signed by the party objecting to arbitration.74
In a very sparsely analyzed opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that:
[w]e would outline the Convention definition of "agreement in writing" to
include either
(1) an arbitral clause in a contract or
(2) an arbitration agreement,
(a) signed by the parties or
(b) contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.7 5
Because what was an issue was "an arbitral clause in a contract," rather
than a stand-alone arbitration agreement, "the qualifications applicable to
arbitration agreements," i.e., the need for signatures from the parties, was
considered not to apply. 76
Other courts have taken a different view of the signature requirement.
Indeed, the very next year, the Second Circuit addressed the same issue in Kahn
Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark International Ltd." Although the Second Circuit
considered the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Sphere Drake,8 since that was the only
other appellate decision then available, the Second Circuit analyzed the various
issues in much more depth and ultimately propounded a very different rule of
interpretation.7
Rather than reading the signature requirement to relate only to the term
n See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., No. 08-65, 2008 WL 2773349,
at *i (U.S. July 14, 2008) (stating the question presented was "the proper scope and application of
article 11(2) of the Convention, relating to when an arbitration clause must be 'signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams"').
" 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).
74 Id. at 669.
7 Id.
76 Id.
n 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle
Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit later adopted the rationale enunciated in
Kahn Lucas. See Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003);
Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 210.
78 Sphere Drake, 16 F.3d at 666.
7 Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 214.
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"arbitration agreement," the Second Circuit held that "the modifying phrase 'signed
by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams' applies to both
'an arbitral clause in a contract' and 'an arbitration agreement.",o In its analysis,
the court relied heavily on the grammatical structure of article 11(2), although the
discussion also referred to the legislative history and texts of the other working-
language versions of the New York Convention."' Ultimately the Second Circuit
came to precisely the opposite conclusion as the Fifth Circuit, holding that the fact
that the arbitration clauses in question were contained in purchase orders that were
only signed by one party meant that the jurisdictional requirements of article 11(2)
were not met and the court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute under section 203 of the FAA.82  As a result, the motion to compel
arbitration was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
Although Kahn Lucas remains good precedent in the Second Circuit
regarding the signature requirement, its analysis of the effect of a negative
determination on the court's jurisdiction was subsequently questioned in Sarhank
Group v. Oracle Corp." This case involved the claim that "the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a signed written arbitration agreement
between Sarhank and [the objecting party], and because the district court failed to
determine independently whether [the objecting party] had consented to
arbitration.""
In dismissing these objections, the Second Circuit took the view that this
"argument depends entirely upon [the objecting party's] view of the merits of the
case, and therefore does not involve a lack of subject matter jurisdiction."" In the
court's mind:
When a party challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction based upon
the merits of the case, that party is merely arguing that the adversary has
failed to state a claim. Where, as here, the Petition seeks relief under the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, the federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, unless the federal claim
is immaterial, frivolous and insubstantial or made solely for the purpose of
8o Id. at 218; Sphere Drake, 16 F.3d at 666. The decision distinguished between the term
"arbitral clause in a contract" and "arbitration agreement," stating that the latter "refers to any
agreement to arbitrate which is not a clause in a larger agreement, whether that agreement is part of a
larger contractual relationship or is an entirely distinct agreement which relates to a non-contractual
dispute." Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 217. Notably, "an agreement in writing" may exist even though the
arbitration provisions in question are found in a contractual document that is subject to certain
conditions precedent before becoming effective. See Coutinho Caro & Co., U.S.A. v. Marcus Trading,
Inc., No. 3:95CV2362, 2000 WL 435566, at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2000).
8 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 217.
82 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §203
(2011); Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 218.
"3 See Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 219.
m 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005). Sarhank bears certain similarities with a line of cases
discussed below in Subpart II.B.2, in that it considers certain issues arising under the FAA, albeit
primarily in passing. See 9 U.S.C. § 203; see also infra notes 120-59 and accompanying text.
However, it will be discussed here for ease of analysis.
"5 Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660.
86 Id. (noting that "cases confusing these issues are frequently found in the reports").
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obtaining jurisdiction.17
Because the party seeking the court's assistance "claimed jurisdiction
under the Convention; described a written agreement between Systems and
Sarhank; in effect, alleged that a legal relationship was created between Oracle [the
objecting party] and Sarhank because Systems was a shell corporation; and
described an arbitral award," then "Sarhank has, for subject matter jurisdiction
purposes, adequately pleaded an arbitral award falling under the Convention.""
Because the objections to the arbitration agreement "are merits questions, not
subject matter jurisdiction questions," the court retained subject matter
jurisdiction."
The Second Circuit in Sarhank therefore distinguished its earlier decision
in Kahn Lucas on the grounds that Kahn Lucas "assumed the dispositive question
was one of subject matter jurisdiction without addressing the distinction between
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction existed and determining-on the
merits-whether the parties had made an agreement to arbitrate." 0 Thus, the
decision in Kahn Lucas is abrogated, at least in the Second Circuit, "to the extent
that Kahn Lucas is read as viewing an element of a claim as a jurisdictional
requisite, the absence of which deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.""
While Sarhank involved a more complex fact pattern than either Kahn Lucas or
Sphere Drake, in that the objection to enforcement was raised by a non-signatory to
the arbitration agreement, the new approach to the jurisdictional issue is intriguing
and obviously acts to expand the types of disputes over which the federal court can
assert its power. 92
Although Kahn Lucas and Sphere Drake clearly reflect two different lines
of analysis with regard to the signature requirement, there is another decision in this
line of cases that must be considered.93 This opinion, Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe
Syndicate, is also decided exclusively under article 11(2) of the New York
Convention.94
The decision comes out of the Eleventh Circuit and is interesting for
several reasons. First, although Czarina made explicit references to both Sphere
Drake and Kahn Lucas, it avoided any attempt to decide between the two
interpretations of the signature requirement." Second, Czarina clearly
87 Id. (citations omitted).
88 Id.
89 Id.
9 Id. at 660 n.2.
9' Id. It is unclear what effect, if any, Sarhank has in the Third Circuit, which adopted the
rationale enunciated in Kahn Lucas prior to the decision in Sarhank See id.; Standard Bent Glass
Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l
Inc., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle
Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).
92 Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660 n.2; Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 210; Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine
Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).
93 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 210; Sphere
Drake, 16 F.3d at 666.
94 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358
F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
9 See Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1291; Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 210; Sphere Drake, 16 F.3d at 666.
2012 61
HeinOnline  -- 48 Stan. J. Int'l L. 61 2012
62 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
demonstrates that the agreement-in-writing requirement found in article 11(2)
applies to both motions to compel an arbitration and motions to enforce an arbitral
award (Sphere Drake and Kahn Lucas both involved motions to compel).9 6 This
second point affects the third, and most interesting, aspect of Czarina.97
Third, the Eleventh Circuit took the view that:
[t]he failure of a party to satisfy article IV's requirements qualifies as one
of the "grounds for refusal or deferral . . . specified in the said
Convention" . . . . Thus, we hold that the party seeking confirmation of an
award falling under the Convention must meet article IV's prerequisites to
establish the district court's subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the
award."
Because the "agreement in writing" requirement was reflected in article IV,
the party had to meet the standard of article I. " As a result of various precedents,
including Kahn Lucas, the court held that "[w]here a party has failed to satisfy the
agreement-in-writing prerequisite, courts have dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction."on
That is precisely the result that obtained in this case, since the party
seeking to enforce the arbitral award was unable to overcome the jurisdictional
problems associated with the writing requirement.'o' This is true even though the
dispute had proceeded to a final determination on the merits, with the Eleventh
Circuit dismissing arguments that (1) the question of arbitrability had been
conclusively decided by the arbitral tribunal and (2) the objecting party had waived
its jurisdictional arguments by participating in the arbitration on the merits.'02
The situation in Czarina may have been influenced by the fact that there
did not appear to be an arbitration agreement in writing between the original parties
to the transaction, which meant that Czarina-the non-signatory attempting to
enforce the arbitral award-had nothing upon which to establish its jurisdictional
foundation.'03 However, the Eleventh Circuit still dismissed for a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, which is different than a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
which would appear to be the approach preferred by the Second Circuit in
96 Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1291 (noting that motions to enforce an award must comply with article
IV of the Convention, which refers specifically to article II); see also Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 210;
Sphere Drake, 16 F.3d at 666. Sarhank also involved a motion to enforce an arbitral award, but
Czarina predates Sarhank and is decided exclusively under the New York Convention. See New York
Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 659; Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1286.
9 See Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1286.
98 Id. at 1292.
99 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), IV; Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1291.
100 Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1291; Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 218. Notably, the decision was handed
down prior to Sarhank. See Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660 n.2.
'01 See Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1294.
102 See id. at 1293-94 (noting the ultimate question of arbitrability is one for the courts and that
the respondent had objected to the arbitral tribunal throughout the proceedings). Cf CTA Lind & Co
Scandinavia AB v. Lind, No. 8:08-cv-1380-T30TGW, 2009 WL 961156, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7,
2007) (noting respondent had failed to object to arbitration in timely manner).
103 See Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1289.
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Sarhank.'"0
b. Exchange of letters or telegrams
U.S. cases have also considered language in the New York Convention
concerning the "exchange of letters or telegrams" as proof of an article II
"agreement in writing."os Some questions have arisen as to whether electronic
mails, facsimiles or the like constitute "letters or telegrams," but those matters are
not conceptually difficult, with most federal courts taking a relatively permissive
attitude towards technological innovations. 106
Instead, the more interesting debate is whether a particular series of
documents can constitute an "exchange of letters or telegrams." 0' Although there
is not as clear a circuit split under this aspect of article 11(2) as exists with respect to
the signature requirement, there are nevertheless several issues that can create
problems for parties.'08
For example, U.S. courts have stated that the documents that are exchanged
under this provision must be sufficiently clear to draw the arbitration provision to
the attention of the parties. Thus, Bothell v. Hitachi Zosen Corp. stated that:
where the words used to refer to a proposed arbitration agreement are so
vague as to be meaningless and no further explanation is provided, either
by attachment, discussion or otherwise, the totality of the documents
exchanged between the parties does not constitute a valid "arbitration
agreement" under the Convention.'o9
Although this particular holding appears to be undisputed, the standard
identified by the court is extremely fact-dependant. As such, parties may find
themselves in litigation to determine whether the documents that were exchanged
were sufficiently precise as to give rise to an enforceable arbitration agreement.
This, of course, does not foster the predictability that is so important to international
commerce. 10
Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy also addressed the issue of
whether the documents that were exchanged demonstrated sufficient clarity so as to
put the other party on notice that arbitration had been proposed."' In that case, the
104 See id.; Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660.
105 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
1o6 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 1 22; see also Ahcom, Inc. v. Smeding, No. C-07-1139
SC, 2008 WL 1701731, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2008); Chloe Z. Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London)
Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1250 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F.
Supp. 879, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
107 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
'0 See id.; see also supra notes 75-107 and accompanying text.
109 97 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2000); see also Polychronakis v. Celebrity Cruises,
Inc., No. 08-21806-CV, 2008 WL 5191104, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2008).
110 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); see
also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538 (1995); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974).
. 333 F.3d 440, 449-50 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting also there was no need for a signature if the
agreement in writing was reflected in an exchange of letters); see also Bothell, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1053
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Third Circuit determined that the appropriate standard was whether the provision
referenced in the exchanged document caused surprise or hardship.12 Since the
reference to arbitration in the exchanged documents was clear, the requirements of
article 11(2) were therefore met."
Interestingly, Standard Bent Glass also imports the Sphere Drake and
Kahn Lucas debate about signatures into the context of "an exchange of letters or
telegrams."" 4 The Third Circuit decided to adopt the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Kahn Lucas, on the grounds that article 11(2):
includes a comma after "arbitration agreement," demonstrating an intent to
apply the signature and exchange of letters requirements to both an arbitral
clause within a contract or a separate arbitration agreement. . . . Thus, the
plain language provides that an arbitration clause is enforceable only if it
was contained in a signed writing or an exchange of letters."'
One last issue that can arise in debates about the "exchange of letters or
telegrams" is whether the documents containing the purported language regarding
arbitration were actually exchanged."6  Although courts have indicated that
agreement can be found either explicitly or implicitly, there still needs to be "a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance."" 7 Although this is a pro-
arbitration position, it nevertheless requires courts to undertake an expensive, fact-
intensive analysis about a jurisdictional issue that may not ultimately be all that
necessary, which is potentially problematic."'
(discussing whether a party should have known that the phrase "General Terms and Conditions" did not
apply to the same concepts encompassed by the phrase "Further Terms & Conditions").
112 See Standard Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 447-48. This case is somewhat problematic in that the
issue of the "exchange of letters or telegrams" under article 11(2) is decided by reference to principles
found in the Uniform Commercial Code. See id at 444-48.
" See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Standard Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 449-50.
114 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Standard Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 449; Kahn
Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on other
grounds by Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); Sphere Drake Ins. PLC
v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994).
"s Standard Bent Glass, 333 F.3d at 449; see also New York Convention, supra note 1, art 11(2);
Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 218.
See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F. Supp. 2d 24,
28 (D.D.C. 2006); Bothell, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
" Dynamo, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citation omitted). Courts in other countries have taken the
view that exchange of documents referring to an arbitration provision are sufficient to meet the
requirements of article 11(2), even if the exchanged documents do not include the arbitration provision
itself. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); di Pietro, supra note 7, at 445. Of course, an
exchange of letters in which one party explicitly disavows the contents of a previous communication
containing an arbitration provision cannot be held to meet the requirements of article 11(2). See New
York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Sen Mar Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879,
882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
"8 BORN, supra note 7, at 619 (claiming "existing form requirements in the New York
Convention . . . are unnecessary and instead serve to frustrate commercial parties' legitimate
expectations and rights"); see also infra notes 245-323 and accompanying text.
48:1
HeinOnline  -- 48 Stan. J. Int'l L. 64 2012
"Agreements in Writing" in International Commercial Arbitration
2. Cases Analyzed Under Section 2 of the FAA
Not all U.S. decisions focus on the precise language of article 11(2) of the
New York Convention."' Instead, some courts have analyzed form requirements in
disputes arising under the Convention by reference primarily to the FAA, despite
the fact that "any dispute involving international commercial arbitration which
meets the [New York] Convention's jurisdictional requirements . .. must be
resolved with reference to that instrument." 20
The FAA's form requirements for actions arising under the New York
Convention are found in two places.' 2' Section 202 defines the Convention as
applying to an arbitration agreement or arbitral award "arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial,
including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title." 22
Section 2 then gives further detail to the requirements identified in section 202 by
stating that these sorts of transactions, contracts, or agreements must be reflected in
writing to be enforceable, either as a "written provision in . .. a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction" or as "an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy." 2 3  These provisions are obviously less
demanding than those found in article 11(2) of the New York Convention.'24
Interestingly, a number of cases that analyze form requirements solely
under the FAA do not do so because the FAA is more generous towards parties
seeking enforcement of an agreement or an award.'25 Instead, decisions like
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. CA. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela
fail to mention the Convention at all, instead relying on diversity to establish
federal jurisdiction and citing domestic provisions of arbitration law regarding the
procedural and substantive disputes.126 Other opinions, including those in Astor
Chocolate Corp. v. Mikroverk Ltd., 127 Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 128 and
Beromun Aktiengesellschaft v. Societa Industriale Agricola "Tress" di Dr.
Domenico e Dr. Antonio dal Ferro'" mention the New York Convention in passing,
but do not consider its provisions with respect to form requirements. Although
19 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
120 Filanto, S.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also New
York Convention, supra note 1; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2011).
121 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
122 Id. § 202.
123 Id. § 2.
124 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); BORN, supra note 7, at 607.
125 See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
126 See 991 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1993) (failing to cite the New York Convention despite presence
of a foreign party and an arbitration provision calling for arbitration in London). Even though one of
the parties was not from a New York Convention state (Venezuela did not join the Convention until
1995), the arbitration was to be seated in a Contracting State, which is the key element in determining
the applicability of the New York Convention. See id. at 45; see also New York Convention, supra
note 1, art. 1(1). The court did cite several provisions of Chapter 2 of the FAA in passing. See 991 F.2d
at 45.
127 See 704 F. Supp. 30,33 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (dealing with series of documents).
120 See 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987) (dealing with series of documents).
129 See 471 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dealing with whether a signature was needed
on an arbitration agreement).
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these cases are all somewhat older, none of them has been explicitly overruled.
This of course creates traps for the unwary and the inexperienced."o
Furthermore, these kinds of U.S.-centric analyses are not limited to older
precedents alone. In 2008, the First Circuit was asked to consider whether a non-
signatory could appeal an order denying a motion to compel arbitration in a dispute
falling under the New York Convention in Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco
International, Inc. "' The court concluded that such an appeal was possible, since
"[w]e do not read anything in the language of Chapter 2 to suggest that a party
seeking an appeal from an order denying international arbitration must have signed
a written arbitration agreement firsthand."' 32
The important part of this decision is whether and to what extent the court
took the requirements of the New York Convention into account."' As it turns out,
that analysis was extremely cursory, with the court stating:
The Convention does require some writing to render an arbitration
agreement enforceable. Article 11 of the Convention contemplates "an
agreement in writing" as a prerequisite to recognizing an arbitration
agreement under the treaty. Here, it is undisputed that there is a writing.
That is a separate issue, however, from whether 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C)
allows interlocutory appeals by non-signatories to such a written
agreement. 134
No consideration was given to the reasons behind the New York
Convention's form requirements or how a decision of this nature might affect the
international commercial order."' This is not to say that the court did not undertake
a policy analysis, for it did cite the strong pro-arbitration policy that exists in the
United States, particularly in international cases.' 6 Nevertheless, the emphasis
1o See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special
Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 120, 124 (2009) (noting various problems facing novices in
international commercial arbitration).
"' 526 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2008). Another recent case that ignores the terms of the New York
Convention in favor of domestic principles of law is Invista North America S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia
Polyamide Intermediates S.A.S., 503 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201 (D.D.C. 2007).
132 Sourcing Unlimited, 526 F.3d at 45; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct.
1896, 1900 (2009) (indicating the ability to appeal should not be confused with other issues).
3 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
134 Sourcing Unlimited., 526 F.3d at 45 n.7. The party seeking to compel arbitration was not a
signatory to the arbitration agreement that qualified as writing under article 11(2). See id. at 44; see also
New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
131 See New York Convention, supra note 1; SG Report, supra note 13, 1 8 (noting some of the
problems that can arise when courts do not take international norms into account when deciding issues
regarding form requirements).
136 The court stated:
[t]o erect a bright-line rule that this court lacks jurisdiction to review
appeals taken under s 16(a)(1)(C) from denials of international arbitration unless
all parties to the dispute are signatories to a written arbitration agreement
would insulate a whole class of denials of motions to compel arbitration from
review until after the litigation has run its course. Such a rule would
contravene the courts' obligation to enforce arbitration agreements under the New
York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA.
Sourcing Unlimited, 526 F.3d at 46 (citations omitted).
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focused entirely on domestic principles and considerations, which could lead to an
outcome that is out of step with practices in other countries.
A somewhat similar analysis was undertaken in Regent Seven Seas
Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC.138 In that case, the court held that "once it has
been asserted that a written agreement exists (even if it is not between the parties in
the litigation), the jurisdictional element has been satisfied. The presence of a
proper written agreement is more properly viewed as an element of the claim rather
than a jurisdictional prerequisite.""' This is, of course, similar to the analysis
undertaken in Sarhank, which was explicitly relied upon by the court in Regent
Seven Seas.'0
The underlying facts were central to this analysis. Essentially:
Although Regent vigorously denies that the arbitration clause is applicable
to it in this case, it does not deny that it is a valid arbitration agreement.
By alleging that the written arbitration agreement applies to Regent, the
Petitioners have met the jurisdictional requirement of § 202. That is, for
the Court to entertain Regent's argument that the written agreement is
insufficient to compel arbitration, the Court must necessarily assume
jurisdiction over the case.141
One interesting outcome of cases like Regent Seven Seas, Sourcing
Unlimited, and Sarhank (which, though discussed above in connection with Kahn
Lucas, falls more neatly into the current discussion, since the Second Circuit relied
primarily on the FAA rather than the New York Convention) is that they all
decrease the focus on the writing requirement as a jurisdictional matter.14 In many
ways, this approach is consistent with developments in other jurisdictions where
"the decisive issue is simply whether the parties agreed to arbitrate . .. with the
writing requirement being reformulated as an evidentiary principle, rather than a
rule of formal validity." 43 This issue is considered further below.'"
'3 See SG Report, supra note 13, T 8; Landau, supra note 7, at 51.
" See No. 06-22347-CIV, 2007 WL 601992 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007). Regent Seven Seas bears
some similarities to cases that attempt to harmonize article 11(2) and the FAA, in that it also recites a
four-element test for jurisdiction. Id. at *3; see also infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
However, the bulk of the analysis appears to fall into the realm of domestic U.S. law, which is why the
case is included in this section.
139 Id. at *4 (citing Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301 (1lth Cir. 2005); Sarhank Grp.
v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 2005); Beiser v. Weysler, 284 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir.
2002)).
140 See Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660; see also supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
141 Regent Seven Seas, 2007 WL 601992, at *4. This posture allowed the court to distinguish
contrary holdings in cases where it was not admitted that an arbitration agreement existed. Id.
(distinguishing Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (1lth Cir. 2004)); see also
Borsack v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Ltd., 974 F. Supp. 293, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating "once a
party establishes that, indeed, a signed writing reflecting the agreement to arbitrate exists, the general
rules of contract law apply to determine which parties are subject to arbitration").
142 See New York Convention, supra note 1; Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d 210; Sourcing Unlimited, Inc.
v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008); Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660; Regent Seven Seas, 2007
WL 601992, at *4.
143 BORN, supra note 7, at 613 (discussing Model Arbitration Law and other national legislation).
'" See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
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3. Cases Analyzed Under Both Article 11(2) of the New York Convention and
Section 2 of the FAA
Those considering form requirements in international commercial
arbitration are not limited to a stark choice between article 11(2) of the New York
Convention or section 2 of the FAA. 4 5 1Instead, some U.S. decisions reflect an
effort to harmonize the two provisions. 4 1
Thus, for example, the Second Circuit stated in Smith/Enron Cogeneration
Ltd. Partnership, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration International Inc. that:
[t]he Convention and the implementing provisions of the FAA set forth
four basic requirements for enforcement of arbitration agreements under
the Convention: (1) there must be a written agreement; (2) it must provide
for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the convention; (3) the
subject matter must be commercial; and (4) it cannot be entirely domestic
*147in scope.
One thing that is not clear from this quote is whether the phrase "written
agreement" is being used in the technical sense of the New York Convention or
whether it is being used more generally, as would be the case if the term were
intended to reflect the requirements of section 2 of the FAA.148 The distinction was
slightly clearer in Lo v. Aetna International, Inc., where the court not only put the
phrase "agreement in writing" in quotation marks, thus suggesting the phrase was
being used as a term of art, but also discussed the parties' compliance with the New
York Convention's signature requirement, albeit somewhat cursorily. 149 Notably,
this variation in punctuation could either reflect or lead to differences in
interpretation, which could cause a circuit split similar to the one involving Sphere
145 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202
(2011).
146 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
147 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1999).
148 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. § 2; Snith/Enron, 198 F.3d at 92.
However, the authority cited by the Second Circuit for this proposition suggests that the phrase "written
agreement" is used in its New York Convention sense. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11;
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, Ledee comes from a
different circuit, which could support a claim that the interpretation is not precisely the same in the
different circuits. Experience shows that courts are partial to grammatical arguments in this area of
law. See id.; see also Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003);
Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on
other grounds by Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).
149 See No. 3:99CVI95JBA, 2000 WL 565465, at *3-4 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2000). The court
there held:
In order for an action to "relate" to an arbitration under the Convention, four questions must be
resolved: (1) whether there is an "agreement in writing" to arbitrate the subject of the dispute; (2)
whether the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3)
whether the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, contractual or not, which is considered
"commercial"; and (4) whether a party to the agreement is a foreign citizen or the relationship
involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation to one or more foreign states.
Id. at *3.
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Drake and Kahn Lucas.5 o
The Eleventh Circuit recently provided some intimation on how the FAA
and the New York Convention might be further harmonized in the future. Bautista
v. Star Cruises focused primarily on issues relating to the exemption of seaman
employment contracts from the scope of the FAA."' However, the dispute arose in
the context of the New York Convention, and in discussing section 202 of the FAA,
the court noted that "section 202 does not incorporate section 2 of the FAA as an
exhaustive description" of the scope of Chapter 2 of the FAA.15 2 "Rather, section
202 uses section 2 as an illustration of the types of agreements covered by" Chapter
2.5'3 Interestingly, this observation opens the door for the argument that Chapter 2
covers a wider variety of agreements than are described in Chapter I of the FAA.'54
Another example of the diminishing writing requirement is Slaney v.
International Amateur Athletic Federation.'5 5 Here, the Seventh Circuit did not
even attempt to address the requirement of an agreement in writing, instead setting
that analysis aside in favor of a conduct-based estoppel analysis.' 6 Because the
respondent had "freely participated" in the underlying arbitration, she was estopped
from claiming later that the arbitration was improper. 5 7
Although this is a very broad-reaching conclusion, the claim in Slaney that
an agreement in writing was "irrelevant" has been classified as dicta and the
decision subsequently distinguished by the Third Circuit."' Indeed, that case
involved a strongly worded concurrence from then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito,
who was clearly in favor of retaining a writing requirement under the New York
Convention. 59
C. Conclusions Regarding the Form Requirement Under U.S. Law
As the preceding discussion shows, U.S. law is highly inconsistent in its
treatment of form requirements in cases involving the New York Convention.6 0 In
fact, the analysis demonstrated several different types of variations existing
simultaneously. First, there is a clear and well-known circuit split with respect to
the signature requirement under article 11(2) of the New York Convention."'
Although that issue has existed for some time, there is apparently a second potential
split brewing with respect to cases that attempt to harmonize the standards reflected
1so See Kahn Lucas, 186 F.3d at 218; Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d
666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994); see also supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
'5' 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (1Ith Cir. 2005); see also 9 U.S.C. § 1.
152 Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1297.
'53 id.
154 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
is 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001).
56 Id.
157 id
1ss See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 284-85 (3d
Cir. 2003).
" See id. at 292 94 (Alito, C.J., concurring).
60 See New York Convention, supra note 1.
61 See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
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in the New York Convention with those found in the FAA.162
Second, there is little agreement among U.S. courts about the proper
relationship between the form requirements of the New York Convention and those
of the FAA. 163 Some opinions focus solely on standards found in the New York
Convention, while others emphasize those reflected in the FAA.'6M  A third category
of cases attempts to blend aspects of both provisions. While each of these
approaches obviously has its benefits,16 1 the fact that all three are being used
simultaneously and in apparent ignorance of the other possible methods of analysis
is highly problematic in an area of law that is intended to reflect a high degree of
consistency and predictability.
Third, some U.S. courts appear to be placing less emphasis on technical
form requirements than was once the case. While this conclusion may simply be
the result of the limited number of judicial decisions chosen for discussion, it may
also be the case that the types of issues that are currently being contested are more
difficult to resolve through a strict textual analysis than those that arose twenty or
thirty years ago. Some might think that courts today face more difficult issues
because many of the basic questions have now become settled law (although the
various circuit splits would suggest that is not the case), but there is evidence to
suggest that more complex legal issues are arising because international commercial
transactions are themselves becoming more complicated and multifaceted.6 6
Indeed, changes in the way multinational actors do business is one of the reasons
why highly technical form requirements may no longer be either wise or necessary,
since they may in many ways be contrary to international commercial practice.
Having described the manner in which the United States deals with form
requirements, it is time to consider issues that arise in other countries so as to
establish the extent to which the United States conforms to international norms.
That discussion is contained in the following section.
162 See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
16 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202
(2011).
164 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202.
16s It is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake an in-depth analysis of the propriety of each
of the three approaches, although each has jurisprudential merit. For example, the two lines of cases
that explicitly invoke the New York Convention are consistent with authorities stating that the terms of
the Convention should be considered in light of international standards. See New York Convention,
supra note 1; see also infra notes 176-97 and accompanying text. While decisions that rely solely on
domestic law may appear improper, given the need to interpret Convention matters in an international
manner, this type of analysis could be justified if it could be shown that U.S. domestic law is more
favorable to the party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement or award than the approach available
under the Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 1; see also infra notes 198-225 and
accompanying text. If that is true, then the method of analysis is entirely consistent with the terms of
the New York Convention, although the judicial reasoning could be improved by explicit references to
article VII(1) of the Convention, which authorizes reliance on domestic law in certain circumstances.
See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1); see also infra notes 198-225 and accompanying
text.
S6 ee BORN, supra note 7, at 1-2.
16 See SG Report, supra note 13, T 7; BORN, supra note 7, at 619 (claiming that "existing form
requirements in the New York Convention . . . are unnecessary and instead serve to frustrate
commercial parties' legitimate expectations and rights").
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III. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES REGARDING THE FORM REQUIREMENT OF THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION
It is universally agreed that the New York Convention is meant to have a
harmonizing effect on national legislation and judicial pronouncements so as to
facilitate international commercial arbitration and thereby promote international
trade.'16 Thus, U.S. courts have recognized that:
[i]n pursuing effective, unified arbitration standards, the Convention's
framers understood that the benefits of the treaty would be undermined if
domestic courts were to inject their "parochial" values into the regime:
In their discussion of [article 11(1)], the delegates to the Convention
voiced frequent concern that courts of signatory countries in which an
agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted
to decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial
views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the
mutually binding nature of the agreements.16
Congress is said to have done its part to fulfill the goals of the Convention
with respect to article II through enactment of the "broad language of section 202"
of the FAA."0 However, no conclusions can yet be made regarding whether and to
what extent U.S. courts have resisted injecting "parochial" values into the
application of the Convention.' 7 ' To understand where the United States stands
with respect to international standards regarding the interpretation and application
of article 11(2) of the New York Convention, it is necessary to describe how other
jurisdictions treat that particular provision.17 2
This task is greatly facilitated by the fact that UNCITRAL undertook a
large-scale, long-term research project seeking input from various states regarding
their interpretation of article 11(2) of the New York Convention.'7 ' This ten-year-
long study provides very useful insights into how different states interpret and
apply the form requirements of the Convention 74 and thus can be used to determine
whether a consensus exists regarding international practice in this area of law. To
that end, the following discussion describes the primary conclusions reached by
168 See BORN, supra note 7, at 92-95; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2-20, 26-19 to 26-22 (2003); NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TT 1.220 to 1.224 (2009).
169 Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
1o See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202
(2011); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1300.
'7' See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1300.
172 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
'73 See id.; UNCITRAL, Working Grp. II (Arbitration), Compilation. of Comments by
Governments, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/661 (May 6, 2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Compilation Note]; UNCITRAL, Working Grp. II (Arbitration), Compilation of Comments by
Governments, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/661/Add.3 (June 12, 2008) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Addendum Note].
174 See New York Convention, supra note 1; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, T1 11-36; SG
Report, supra note 13, f 28-32; Haarmann, supra note 7, at 126; Xiao & Long, supra note 7, at 570.
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UNCITRAL, focusing in particular on national interpretation of article 11(2), the
interplay between article 11(2) and article VII(1), enactment and application of the
UNCITRAL Recommendation, and the purpose and effect of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law).'
A. International Interpretation ofArticle 11(2) of the New York Convention
According to research conducted by UNCITRAL, state courts vary in their
application of article 11(2) of the New York Convention, although the differences
are primarily seen at a state-to-state level rather than within a single jurisdiction, as
is the case in the United States. 7 6 For example, some states "strictly appl[y] the
requirements" reflected in article 11(2) and enforce arbitral awards "only when
either the contract containing the arbitration clause or the arbitration agreement was
signed by the parties or was contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams." 77
The United States falls into this category of countries, although the U.S. is singled
out by UNCITRAL as having a particularly inconsistent and divergent national
approach to the signature requirement under article 11(2). 178 Although UNCITRAL
does not explicitly offer an opinion as to which of the two lines of U.S. cases is the
correct reading of the New York Convention, certain statements suggest that
UNCITRAL takes the view that the signature requirement applies to both
arbitration agreements and arbitral clauses in contracts.
For the most part, courts adopting a strict approach to the writing
requirement do not allow oral agreements to arbitrate, even if that agreement is
subsequently confirmed in writing or through some sort of conduct such as
appearance before the arbitrator or performance of the contract.8 0 Similarly, states
exhibiting a strict approach to issues of form typically do not permit courts to
recognize arbitration agreements based on prior trade practices.'8 '
1 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(1); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 18th Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985),
revised by UNCITRAL, Revised Articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law];
UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
17 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Compilation Note, supra note
178, at 2-7; UNCITRAL Addendum Note, supra note 173, at 2-3; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, i
12-15.
1n UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, T 12 (citing, inter alia, Delta Cereales Espahia SL (Spain) v.
Barredo Hermanos SA, XXVI Y.B. COMM. ARB. 854, 854-55 (2001) (Spain, Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1998);
Hertogenbosh, Sneek Hardhout Imp. BV (Neth.) v. Karl Schlueter KG (Ger.), XXI Y.B. COMM. ARB.
643, 644 (1996) (Neth., Court of Appeal, July 14, 1995)).
1 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 14
(citing, inter alia, Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999), partially
abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005);
Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994); Coutinho Caro & Co.,
U.S.A. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., No. 3:95CV2362, 2000 WL 435566 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2000); Bothell
v. Hitachi Zosen Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Sen Mar Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum
Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
i7 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 1 11
(stating that the requirement of "either a signature or an exchange of documents ... ensures that the
parties' assent to arbitration is expressly recorded"); id. 14 (noting that cases distinguishing the
treatment of arbitration agreements and arbitral clauses have not been widely followed).
"0 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 13.
181 See id. But see id. 1 17 (citing Delta Cereals Espana SL (Spain) v. Barredo Hermanos SA
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While the interpretation of the signature requirement is relatively standard
around the world (with the exception of the United States), rules regarding the
exchange of documents vary more widely.'82 Some national courts interpret the
term "exchange" strictly, meaning both a written offer and a written acceptance of
an arbitration provision, while other courts in other states consider "a reference to
the arbitration clause or agreement in subsequent correspondence emanating from
the party to which the arbitration clause or agreement was sent . .. sufficient."1 83 in
some cases, courts consider slightly more liberal treatment to be appropriate if the
parties are in an ongoing relationship. 8 4 In other instances, courts conclude that the
requirements of article 11(2) have been met even when the arbitration provision was
not included in the letters that were exchanged between the parties, so long as the
documents that were exchanged made reference to the arbitration. "' Among the
examples cited in the latter category of cases is a U.S. decision that justified its
actions by reference to strong national policies in favor of arbitration.'16
Courts adopting a slightly less strict approach to the form requirement are
split as to whether they allow the form requirements to be satisfied through other
means. For example, only some of these countries overlook the technical
requirements of article 11(2) based on principles of estoppel resulting from conduct,
leading UNCITRAL to note that "[n]o leading approach is evident from the case
law." 188
Finally, most states reflect relatively liberal attitudes towards new forms of
electronic technology and consider them to fall within the ambit of "letters or
telegrams.""' In so doing, courts do not take the view that article 11(2) names an
exclusive list of documents deemed sufficient to evidence an "agreement in
writing."' 90 In fact, one Swiss decision notes that unsigned writings are becoming
increasingly important in modem electronic commerce, making signature
requirements less important.' 9' However, other have states adopted a stricter
approach to electronic communications. 92
The decisions discussed in this section revolve around the text of the
(Spain), XXVI Y.B. COMM. ARB. 854 (2001) (Spain, Sup. Ct., Oct. 6, 1998) and suggesting the New
York Convention allowed agreement through trade usages).
182 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, IT 14, 35.
183 Id. 15.
184 Id. 1 9.
85 Id. 20.
186 See id. (citing Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449-50 (3d Cir.
2003)).
187 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 16.
18 See id. 17 (citing Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001);
China Nanhai Oil Joint Serv. Corp. Shenzhen Branche (China) v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., XX Y.B.
COMM. ARB. 671, 673-77 (H.K. High Ct., July 13, 1994) (comparing several jurisdictions); Greek Co.
v. FR German Co., XIV Y.B. COMM. ARB. 638, 638-39 (1989) (Greece, Court of Appeal of Athens,
1984)).
189 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 22.
190 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); see also UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 22
(citing Chloe Z. Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1250 (S.D. Cal.
2000)).
UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 23 (citing Compagnie de Nay. et Transports S.A. v.
Mediterranean Shipping Co., XXI Y.B. COMM. ARB. 690, 697 (Swiss Fed. Trib., 1996)).
192 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 23 (citing a Norwegian decision concluding that electronic
mail did not satisfy the requirements of article 11(2)).
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Convention itself, and therefore focus on the language of article 11(2).'9' However,
even those states that take something of a "strict" view towards the interpretation of
article 11(2) have developed a variety of escape mechanisms to take changing
commercial circumstances into account.194  For the most part, U.S. decisions
conform to international norms, although there are a few areas, such as the
interpretation of the writing requirement, where the United States is out of step with
practices adopted by other signatories of the Convention."
However, the UNCITRAL studies show that not all courts have adopted
the same kind of interpretive approach to form requirements under the New York
Convention. " Some states impose "less demanding requirements," typically
through recourse to broad provisions of national law.'97 Those requirements are
discussed in the next section.
B. International Interplay Between Article 11(2) and Article VII(1) of the New
York Convention
Although U.S. courts very seldom invoke article VII(1) of the New York
Convention,'" that provision is central to many states' approach to the form
requirements under the New York Convention.' 99 The text of article VII(1) is quite
straightforward, simply stating that:
[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive any
193 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 12; see also New York Convention, supra note 1, art.
11(2).
194 See New York Convention, supra note 1; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 12.
195 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); see also supra notes 35-172 and
accompanying text.
196 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 24.
197 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 12.
1 Indeed, only a few U.S. decisions even mention article VII of the New York Convention and
most appear to deny its successful invocation. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII; Baker
Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying use of article VII);
Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Inv., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving "overlapping
coverage" between the FAA and the New York Convention pursuant to article VII); Int'l Trading &
Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 29 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying use of
article VII); Kailroy Produce Co. v. Pac. Tomato Growers, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (D.C. Ariz.
2010) (allowing use of article VII, albeit in a context that would allow imposition of domestic law that
was less favorable to a party seeking to enforce an arbitral award); Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts,
B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1343-44 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (denying use of article
VII and claiming that nothing in previous case law and the text of section 208 "indicates that Chapter I
is capable of serving as the primary framework for confirming an award 'not considered as domestic'
under the Convention . . . . Rather, Chapter I of the FAA merely augments the Convention to the extent
no conflict exists between the two instruments. This Court will utilize Chapter I of the FAA
accordingly"), vacated on other grounds, 377 F.3d 1164 (11 th Cir. 2004); Spier v. Calzaturificio
Teenica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying use of article VII); Arbitration
Between Chromalloy Aeroservices and Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 914 (D.D.C. 1996)
(denying use of article VII); see also Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 518 n.4 (2d Cir.
1975) (denying use of article VII in context of a bilateral treaty); Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v.
Electrificadora Del Atlantico S.A. E.S.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing article VII only
in the context of distinguishing Chromalloy, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 12), affd, 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
' See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,
24-34.
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interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of
the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.*
A proper understanding of article VII is critical to the analysis of form
requirements under the Convention, since:
[t]he New York Convention has been described as having a "pro-
enforcement" bias in that it seeks to encourage enforcement of awards in
the greatest number of cases possible. That purpose was achieved through
article VII(1) by removing conditions for recognition and enforcement in
national laws that were more stringent than the conditions in the New York
Convention, while allowing the continued application of any national
provisions that gave special or more favourable rights to a party seeking to
enforce an award.20'
Article VII(1) therefore allows parties seeking to enforce an arbitral
agreement or award that falls under the New York Convention to rely on more
favorable provisions found in national law.2 02 As such, courts around the world
have considered use of this provision in situations where domestic law regarding
the definition of an "agreement in writing" is more liberal than the requirement
found in article 11(2).203
Recourse to national law through article VII(l) is not without its
problems.2 04 Indeed, as the Secretary General of the United Nations himself noted:
Some national laws ... have addressed the problem [of the form
requirement under article 11(2)] and broadened the definition of writing.
While the problem of the outdated form requirement is thereby being dealt
with, the fact that these laws contain different solutions creates other
difficulties, caused by the disparity of laws. The Working Group may wish
to consider that this disparity, which may grow in the future, increases the
desirability of finding internationally harmonized solutions. Meanwhile,
because the definition in international legislative texts as well as in many
national laws has remained unchanged, undesirable consequences continue
to arise. They are, for example, that parties may expect to be able to
200 New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VIl.
201 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 24 (citing the SG Report, supra note 13); see also New
York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); SG Report, supra note 13, $ 21.
202 See Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 77; see also BORN, supra note 7, at 618. However, article
VII(I) cannot support application of domestic laws that are less favorable to enforcement of arbitral
agreements or awards falling under the New York Convention. See Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 77;
see also BORN, supra note 7, at 618. Therefore, cases that allow parties to invoke domestic defenses to
enforcement of an award subject to the New York Convention based on invocation of article VII are
wrongly decided as a matter of international law. See Kailroy Produce Co. v. Pac. Tomato Growers,
Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 (D. Ariz. 2010) (incorrectly relying on article VII to allow
consideration of a defense to enforcement of an arbitral award based on manifest disregard of law).
203 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(1); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,
IT 24-34.
204 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1).
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initiate arbitral proceedings, but their expectations are frustrated.
Furthermore, courts, in order to reach results they consider appropriate
under the circumstances, have to resort to expansive and even strained
interpretations of the definition of writing. In addition, difficulties may
arise when awards are rendered relying on laws providing a broader
definition of writing but are brought for enforcement to a jurisdiction
which has a narrower definition.205
These concerns give rise to the question whether article VII(1) should be
read to allow states to derogate from the form requirements described in the New
York Convention, or whether issues arising under article 11(2) should be exempt
from that aspect of the Convention.20 6 Certainly there is some logic in the idea that
the New York Convention was intended to provide a single international standard
that would be uniformly applied across national borders, an approach that would
seem most valuable in terms of requirements relating to formal validity of
arbitration agreements. 207
Not only is this view consistent with the espoused purposes of the
Convention, it provides parties with clarity and predictability, both important goals
in the world of international commerce. 208 This approach-which is more
consistent with French and Spanish versions of the New York Convention than with
English versions-reflects the view that article 11(2) constitutes a "minimum" form
requirement which would not allow parties to take advantage of more generous
provisions of national law.
Ultimately, the minimalist approach falters because it fails to take into
account the express language of article VII(1), which allows parties to take
210
advantage of more liberal provisions of national law. Instead, the better and more
holistic reading of the Convention is that article VII(1) permits states to invoke
more generous provisions of national law even when construing form requirements
under article 11(2) of the Convention. 2 ' As such, article 11(2) is perhaps more
properly said to "establish a 'maximum' requirement for formal validity." 212
The maximalist reading of article 11(2) has found support in a number of
court decisions that have "upheld the validity of an arbitration agreement under
domestic law, which would not have been considered as valid under the New York
Convention."2 3  These opinions either rely explicitly on article VII(1) or simply
205 SG Report, supra note 13, 1 8. Some of the factual scenarios that can lead to problems are
discussed in the Secretary General's Report. See id. 11 12-16.
206 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l).
207 Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)); see also UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 132.
208 See New York Convention, supra note 1; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1300; BORN, supra note 7, at
71.
209 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); BORN, supra note 7, at 539-40 (noting
these readings typically rely on French and Spanish versions of the New York Convention).
210 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); BORN, supra note 7, at 541.
211 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,
1 24; BORN, supra note 7, at 536-37.
212 BORN, supra note 7, at 536.
213 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,1 27.
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apply domestic law.21 4 For example, a number of decisions, including several from
the United States, were noted by UNCITRAL for having "cited the New York
Convention but then applied domestic legal principles to the question whether the
arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable." 2 5 Other opinions took the view
that the New York Convention did not supersede domestic law.216
Some question exists at the international level as to whether article VII(1)
applies equally to motions to compel arbitration as well as motions to enforce
arbitral awards. 2 17 A number of states that have addressed that issue have concluded
that the more favorable treatment provision can be extended to motions to compel
arbitration, even though article VII(1) on its face only refers to enforcement
proceedings, an approach that has also been adopted in the United States.21 8
As this discussion shows, there is a great deal of variation in national
treatment of form requirements under the New York Convention, regardless of
whether courts rely primarily on the Convention or on more generous provisions of
national law.2 9 While the United States is in accord with international practice in a
number of areas, U.S. decisions have been singled out at times as being particularly
exceptional.220
Although the diversity of national approaches to form requirements under
the Convention is in one way legitimate, in that a large number of states appear to
be acting in ways that are more generous than that required under the New York
Convention,221 that does not mean that the situation should continue. Indeed,
"[d]ifferent judicial interpretations of the form requirement and a trend to avoid the
form requirement by reference to other legal doctrines may undermine the
principles of the New York Convention and the harmonisation of law regarding
recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements."222
The difficulty, of course, is finding a viable means of imposing a higher
degree of international uniformity, given that the Convention itself expressly
214 See id (citing Petrasol BV (Neth.) v. Stolt Spur Inc. (Lib.), XXII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 762, 763
(Neth., Court of First Instance, Rotterdam, Sept. 28, 1995); Gas Authority of India, Ltd. v. SPIE-
CAPAG, SA (Fr.), XXIII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 688, 691-701 (India, Delhi High Ct., Oct. 15, 1993)); see
also di Pietro, supra note 7, at 448-49.
21 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, IT 28-29 (citing, inter alia, Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v.
C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 991 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1993); Beromun
Aktiengesellschaft v. Societa Industriale Agricola "Tresse" di Dr. Domenico e Dr. Antonio dal Ferro,
41 F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). As noted previously, these decisions do not seem to have
relied on article VII in any way, but instead appear to have simply assumed that domestic law
controlled. See supra notes 122-48 and accompanying text.
216 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 29 (citing, inter alia, Astor Chocolate Corp. v.
Mikroverk Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
217 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 34;
BORN, supra note 7, at 545-46.
218 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 34
(citing XL Ins. Ltd. v. Owens Corning, XXVI Y.B. COMM. ARB. 869, 872 (2001) (United Kingdom,
Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, July 28, 2000)); see supra notes 216-18 and
accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 35-163 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
221 See UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 1 36; see also supra notes 216-18 and accompanying
text.
222 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,135.
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permits a certain degree of diversity via article VII(1). 223 Over the years,
UNCITRAL considered a number of potential solutions to the problems associated
with form requirements under the New York Convention. 224 One possibility-
known as the UNCITRAL Recommendation-came to fruition in 2006 and is
discussed in the next section.225
C. UNCITRAL Recommendation
Although UNCITRAL considered a variety of options, including some
(such as the amendment of the New York Convention) that would be mandatory in
nature, it ultimately decided that an optional protocol was the better course of
action.226 Therefore, the UNCITRAL Recommendation is simply that-a
recommendation-although it may be a highly persuasive guide to interpretation of
the Convention, particularly under U.S. law.227
The UNCITRAL Recommendation is relatively brief in its substantive
provisions, stating simply that it:
1. Recommends that article II, paragraph 2, of the [New York Convention]
be applied recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not
exhaustive;
2. Recommends also that article VII, paragraph 1, of the [New York
Convention] should be applied to allow any interested party to avail itself
of rights it may have, under the law or treaties of the country where an
arbitration agreement is sought to be relied upon, to seek recognition of the
221
validity of such an arbitration agreement.
Although this language does not appear to go very far on its face, the
proposed revisions may nevertheless result in a significant change in how form
requirements are interpreted and applied in the U.S. and elsewhere.229
The UNCITRAL Recommendation has been well-received by a variety of
countries, either resulting in affirmative reforms or the reinforcement of existing
223 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1).
224 See id art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 1 36.
225 See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 36;
BORN, supra note 7, at 617-19; Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 74-79.
226 See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; SG Report, supra note 13, 18. Calls are
occasionally made to revise or replace the New York Convention and are met with varying degrees of
receptivity. See Charles H. Brower, 11 & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the International
Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415, 438 (2003); Carolyn B. Lamm, Comments on the Proposal to
Amend the New York Convention, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 697, 706 (Albert Jan
van den Berg ed., XIV ICCA Cong. Ser. 2009). Though there may or may not be merit to those
proposals in other contexts, it has been said that amending the New York Convention would not be a
wise solution to the problems associated with form requirements, particularly in light of other viable
alternatives. See Landau, supra note 7, at 61-79.
227 See infra notes 273-76 and accompanying text.
228 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
229 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); see infra notes 265-79 and accompanying
text.
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approaches to article II(2).230 The early success of the Recommendation suggests
that its provisions will soon be put into effect elsewhere. When considering how to
implement this particular instrument, national courts should bear in mind the factors
that motivated UNCITRAL to act. For example, the UNCITRAL Recommendation
indicates, in part, that it was drafted:
Taking into account article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention, a purpose
of which is to enable the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to the
greatest extent, in particular by recognizing the right of any interested party
to avail itself of law or treaties of the country where the award is sought to
be relied upon, including where such law or treaties offer a regime more
favourable than the Convention,
Considering the wide use of electronic commerce,
Taking into account international legal instruments, such as the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as
subsequently revised, particularly with respect to article 7, the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures and the United Nations Convention on the Use of
Electronic Communications in International Contracts,
Taking into account also enactments of domestic legislation, as well as
case law, more favourable than the Convention in respect of form
requirement [sic] governing arbitration agreements, arbitration proceedings
and the enforcement of arbitral awards.231
These rationales lead to the same conclusions as the Recommendation
itself, namely that courts should (1) rely on the most favorable provision of law
available (be it domestic or international) so as to give effect to an arbitration
agreement or award and (2) take changes in technology into account when
considering whether form requirements have been met. However, this list of
motivating factors is important because it demonstrates that the UNCITRAL
Recommendation is not simply the opinion of a single body (i.e., UNCITRAL).
Instead, the list of reasons why the Recommendation was adopted shows that the
UNCITRAL Recommendation is based on international consensus both with
respect to "enactments of domestic legislation, as well as case law, more favourable
than the Convention in respect of form requirement[s]" and regarding the
increasingly widespread recognition of electronic commerce and legal practices.232
Furthermore, these supporting rationales reiterate the notion that "greater
uniformity of national laws on arbitration would further the effectiveness of
arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes,"233 thus reminding nations
230 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Compilation Note, supra note
173, at 2-6; UNCITRAL Addendum Note, supra note 173, at 2-3.
231 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14 (citations omitted).
232 id.
233 Id. (quoting a resolution from the Conference of Plenipotentiaries that prepared and opened the
New York Convention for signature).
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around the world to consider not only their own domestic law when deciding to
implement the UNCITRAL Recommendation, but also practices in other countries.
D. The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law
When considering how to address the inconsistencies that arose as a result
of national courts' interpretation and application of article 11(2) of the New York
Convention, UNCITRAL did not limit itself to enactment of the UNCITRAL
Recommendation.23 4 UNCITRAL simultaneously made several amendments to the
Model Arbitration Law, including several key changes to article 7, which contains
the statutory form requirements. 23 5 The United States has not adopted either the
original (1985) or amended (2006) version of the Model Arbitration Law, but the
instrument has been very successful internationally, with sixty-six countries and
seven U.S. states adopting its provisions in whole or in part.236
Although the Model Arbitration Law is not binding as a matter of U.S.
federal law, the 2006 revisions may shed light into the proper reading of article
11(2) of the New York Convention, even if only in a persuasive manner.23 Indeed,
UNCITRAL specifically noted the relevance of the 2006 Model Arbitration Law in
the UNCITRAL Recommendation, which suggests that the two documents should
be read together. 238  The United Nations General Assembly has also noted the
connection between the revised Model Arbitration Law and the UNCITRAL
Recommendation as a means of promoting uniformity in the interpretation and
application of the New York Convention. 239 Therefore, it is appropriate for courts
to consider the revisions to the Model Arbitration Law when deciding issues
relating to article 11(2) of the New York Convention, even if that jurisdiction has
not formally adopted the Model Law itself. 240
Article 7 of the revised Model Arbitration Law discusses form
requirements associated with international commercial arbitration and provides two
different options for states to consider. 24 ' These provisions read:
Option I
Article 7. Definition and form of arbitration agreement
234 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note
14.
235 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
236 See UNCITRAL, Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitrationstatus.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Status].
237 See Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 75-77.
238 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note
14.
239 See G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter General Assembly
Resolution]. See generally New York Convention, supra note 1; Model Arbitration Law, supra note
175; UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
240 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
241 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
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(1) "Arbitration agreement" is an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(3) An arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any
form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been
concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.
(4) The requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing is met by
an electronic communication if the information contained therein is
accessible so as to be useable for subsequent reference; "electronic
communication" means any communication that the parties make by means
of data messages; "data message" means information generated, sent,
received or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means,
including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
(5) Furthermore, an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in
an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of
an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(6) The reference in a contract to any document containing an arbitration
clause constitutes an arbitration agreement in writing, provided that the
reference is such as to make that clause part of the contract.
Option 1I
Article 7. Definition of arbitration agreement
"Arbitration agreement" is an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not. 242
Notably, both of these options use a more expansive definition of an
arbitration agreement than is reflected in article 11(2) of the New York Convention,
although the second alternative is obviously the broader of the two texts. 243 The
usefulness of these provisions to U.S. courts is discussed in the next section, which
contains proposals about the future direction of U.S. law concerning form
242 id
243 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2). The second option eliminates the writing
requirement altogether. See James E. Costello, Unveiling the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 65
Disp. RESOL. J. 21, 147 (May-Oct. 2010).
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requirements under the New York Convention.24
IV. FUTURE DIRECTION OF U.S. LAW CONCERNING FORM REQUIREMENTS
The purpose of this Article was twofold. First, the aim was to identify
whether there was a problem with the manner in which U.S. law applied and
interpreted article 11(2) of the New York Convention.24 5 Second, if a problem did
exist, the goal was to provide a realistic proposal for improving the situation.
With respect to the first objective, the preceding discussion clearly
demonstrates some significant issues relating to how U.S. courts address form
requirements in actions arising under the New York Convention.2 46 Inconsistencies
exist at several levels. First, the interpretation of the language of article 11(2) itself
varies from circuit to circuit, particularly with respect to the signature
requirement.247 Furthermore, the current approach to an "exchange of letters or
telegrams" requires a highly fact-specific analysis, the outcome of which is difficult
for parties to predict in advance.2 4 8
Second, courts occasionally rely on domestic law without regard to the
Convention regime.249 Although the FAA may be more favorable in ways to those
wishing to enforce an arbitration agreement or award, the current jurisprudence
demonstrates analytical shortcomings that could lead to problems for the unwary.250
It also creates an unpredictable situation that is troubling for international actors.
Third, courts attempting to meld domestic and international approaches to
form requirements may be laying the groundwork for another circuit split by
adopting standards inconsistently across jurisdictional lines.25 Courts that use this
approach may simply be repackaging existing problems into new forms, at least to
the extent that the newly enunciated standards incorporate old understandings of
how article 11(2) is to be interpreted and applied.252 Finally, the fact that U.S. courts
have adopted three different analytical models-each with its own potential
grounds for inconsistency-creates its own independent kind of trouble.
The New York Convention was obviously never intended to generate this
much variation in the way its terms were interpreted and applied. 253 Therefore, the
second goal of this Article must be undertaken: the identification of a viable
proposal for reform.
When considering how to address the problems associated with the form
requirements of the New York Convention, it is important for courts and Congress
to consider not only domestic principles of law, but international ones as well.254
244 See id.
245 See id
246 See id.; see also supra notes 23-172 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 72-107 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 122-48 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
252 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
253 See id
254 See id.; BORN, supra note 7, at 544.
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This international focus is necessary and appropriate for both legal and pragmatic
reasons.
For example, "delegates to the [New York] Convention voiced frequent
concern that courts of signatory countries ... should not be permitted to decline
enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability
or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding nature of the
agreements."255 In adopting and ratifying the New York Convention, Congress
embraced that view of the Convention's purpose and procedure as well, and federal
courts of all levels have been charged with implementing this kind of
internationally minded approach.25 6  Furthermore, an internationally oriented
method of interpretation is in accordance with international principles regarding
treaty interpretation.257 Therefore, looking to international practices and norms is
the right way to proceed as a matter of law.
A transnational approach to the New York Convention also makes good
business sense because it helps facilitate the "orderliness and predictability essential
to any international business transaction." 258  The failure to create consistent
standards across borders can frustrate party expectations about the initiation of
proceedings or enforcement awards as well as increase transactional costs, to the
extent that parties must go to court to establish their various rights and
responsibilities.259
Admittedly, it is somewhat difficult for the United States to adopt a truly
international approach to article 11(2) in the absence of a global consensus about the
precise rules to be used in interpreting and applying the provision in question.260
255 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Bautista v. Star Cruises,
396 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005).
256 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1300; see also Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
257 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(l), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(stating that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose") [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. Although the Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the United States, it has
been relied upon by several members of the U.S. Supreme Court and in numerous lower federal
opinions. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2007 n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Some circuits consider the Vienna
Convention "'an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,' insofar as it reflects
actual state practices." Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, "[t]he
Department of State considers the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties an authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice." Id. Although the Vienna Convention has a non-retroactivity clause,
see Vienna Convention, supra, art. 4, the United States acceded to the New York Convention on
September 30, 1970, several months after signing the Vienna Convention. See UNCITRAL, Status:
1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html (last visited
Jan. 3, 2012); United Nations Treaty Collection, Status: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailslll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XXIII-&chapter-23&T
emp=mtdsg3&lang-en (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). Therefore, the interpretive techniques outlined in the
Vienna Convention can be appropriately applied to questions involving the New York Convention. See
New York Convention, supra note 1; Vienna Convention, supra.
258 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516; see also New York Convention, supra note 1; Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S. at 627.
259 See SG Report, supra note 13, 8.
260 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); see also supra notes 181-230 and
accompanying text.
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However, recent studies-including those undertaken by UNCITRAL-suggest
that an increasing number of states are moving to liberalize their treatment of the
form requirements in the New York Convention.2 61 In fact, several countries have
already done so. Furthermore, UNCITRAL has identified several ways that
individual nations can participate in this process, an endeavor that will not only help
further one of the primary goals of the New York Convention (i.e., the wide
enforceability of international arbitration agreements and awards), but will also help
26'
achieve a second aim, namely the harmonization of national laws on arbitration.26
There are three means by which states can improve their approach to form
requirements under the New York Convention.263 These are:
(1) interpreting article 11(2) in a "non-exhaustive" manner;
(2) allowing article VII(1) to be used to allow parties to rely on more
favorable provisions of national law when seeking to compel arbitration or
enforce an arbitral award;
(3) adopting the Model Arbitration Law, in particular article 7 concerning
form requirements.264
Courts and legislatures may adopt these proposals individually or
collectively. Each of the three options is discussed in turn below.
A. Adoption of an Expansive Reading ofArticle II(2) of the New York
Convention
The first method by which change can occur in the U.S. legal order is if
U.S. courts were to explicitly adopt that part of the UNCITRAL Recommendation
indicating that article 11(2) of the New York Convention should "be applied
recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not exhaustive." 265 As it
turns out, this would be a relatively easy proposal to adopt.
At this point, no U.S. court has referred to the UNCITRAL
Recommendation in any judicial opinion. However, UNCITRAL reports and
recommendations have proven persuasive to federal courts in other contexts where
Congress has adopted an instrument drafted by UNCITRAL.2 6 In fact, at least one
federal court has looked to a UNCITRAL report to help construe the provisions of a
state statute based on the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law.267
261 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12; Landau,
supra note 7, at 51; see also supra notes 181-230 and accompanying text.
262 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note
14.
263 See New York Convention, supra note 1.
264 See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12,136.
265 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
266 See In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing a UNCITRAL
Working Group Report when construing the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, which has been implemented into domestic law).
267 See Bahrain Telecomms. Co. v. Discoverytel, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 176, 183-84 (D. Conn.
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The fact that the UNCITRAL Recommendation postdates U.S. ratification
of the New York Convention is not in any way problematic. 268 The U.S. Supreme
Court itself has noted that it is appropriate, when construing an international treaty
that has been incorporated into domestic U.S. law, to consider "'the postratification
understanding' of signatory nations."2 69 This view is in accordance with general
principles of public international law and the interpretive approach set forth in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.27 Therefore, U.S. courts can and
indeed should consider the UNCITRAL Recommendation as highly persuasive
authority regarding the interpretation of article 11(2), even though the
Recommendation was enacted after the adoption of the New York Convention.27 1
In one way, this step might appear unnecessary, since a number of lower
federal courts already interpret article 1(2) relatively broadly.2 72 However, it would
be better for courts to rely explicitly on the UNCITRAL Recommendation, since
that will demonstrate the United States' desire to conform with international
practices and norms by embracing "greater uniformity of national laws on
arbitration."273
While lower federal courts are certainly empowered to take this step on
their own, it may be best if the Supreme Court were to address this issue, perhaps
by granting certiorari to resolve existing circuit splits regarding the interpretation of
article II(2).274 Indeed, certiorari has already been sought on this and related issues
in the past.275
While it is easy to say that article 11(2) should "be applied recognizing that
the circumstances described therein are not exhaustive," putting that edict into
practice may be slightly more difficult, since judges may wonder where precisely to
draw the line.276 Courts could adopt a variety of approaches under the UNCITRAL
Recommendation, but the best may be to "dispense with all formal requirements for
international arbitration agreements and instead consider solely the question
2007); see also Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175. The fact that the report providing guidance on
the interpretation of the Model Arbitration Law was published after the state had enacted its version of
the Law created no interpretive difficulties. See Bahrain Telecomms., 476 F. Supp. 2d at 184 (citing a
2005 UNCITRAL report); UNCITRAL Status, supra note 236 (noting Connecticut adopted the Model
Arbitration Law in 2000); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
268 See New York Convention, supra note 1; UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
269 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)).
270 See Vienna Convention, supra note 262, art. 31(3)(a) (stating in part that when interpreting
treaties, "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation"); Landau, supra note 7, at 74-79. For the persuasiveness of the Vienna
Convention in U.S. law, see supra note 262.
271 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note
14.
272 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); see also supra notes 204-30 and
accompanying text.
273 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; see also New York Convention, supra note 1;
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289,
1300 (11th Cir. 2005).
274 See supra notes 75-154 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
276 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
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whether or not a party [has] in fact consented to an arbitration agreement."277
Alternatively, courts could state that the requirement of a writing will be construed
not as meaning "either an 'exchange' of writings or 'signed' writings, but
merely . .. some written evidence of an agreement to arbitrate." 278 Either approach
would be an improvement over current practices and would have the benefit of (1)
expanding the realm of arbitrable disputes and arbitration agreements and (2)
reducing unnecessary litigation. Furthermore, neither approach violates the
fundamental concept that a person cannot be required to arbitrate a dispute without
consenting to do so, since there still must be evidence of an agreement to
arbitrate.279
B. Explicit Adoption ofDomestic Legal Standards Through Reliance on
Article VHI(1) of the New York Convention
The second way in which change can be effected in the United States is
through the explicit adoption of the second portion of the UNCITRAL
Recommendation, which states that article VII(l) "should be applied to allow any
interested party to avail itself of rights it may have, under the law or treaties of the
country where an arbitration agreement is sought to be relied upon, to seek
recognition of the validity of such an arbitration agreement." 280  Notably, the
language in the Recommendation covers both motions to compel arbitration and
motions to enforce arbitral awards, which eliminates one potential area of dispute.28'
Adopting this aspect of the UNCITRAL Recommendation would allow
U.S. courts to apply the legal standards enunciated in section 2 of the FAA even in
cases arising under article 11(2) of the New York Convention.282 This is permitted
as a matter of international law because U.S. domestic law regarding form
requirements is more favorable to enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award
than is article 11(2) of the Convention. 283 Furthermore, adopting the UNCITRAL
Recommendation is consistent with U.S. policy favoring expansive interpretation of
arbitral agreements and easy enforceability of arbitral awards.284
In many ways, it would be best if the U.S. Supreme Court were to adopt
this approach, since that would facilitate the harmonization of judicial practices
nationwide, thus increasing predictability in this area of law. 285 However, lower
277 BORN, supra note 7, at 618; see also UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
278 BORN, supra note 7, at 618 (citations omitted).
279 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989) (noting arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion").
280 UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
281 See id.; see also supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
282 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VI(1); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2011); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
283 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); 9 U.S.C. § 2; BORN, supra note 7,
at 607 (noting "[f]ower U.S. courts have repeatedly held that the FAA's written form requirements are
less demanding than those of the New York Convention").
284 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985);
UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
285 These are both goals of the New York Convention and the U.S. Supreme Court. See New
York Convention, supra note 1; UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S. at 627; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974).
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federal courts are also empowered, if not required, to take the UNCITRAL
Recommendation into account in relevant cases.286 Indeed, UNCITRAL's explicit
recommendation that article VII(l) be relied upon by national courts to increase the
enforceability of arbitral awards and agreements is highly persuasive evidence of
the proper reading of the Convention, even if this understanding of the Convention
is enunciated postratification.287
When adopting this approach, judges should make explicit mention of
article VII(1) and the UNCITRAL Recommendation, so as to demonstrate U.S.
28
adherence to international norms and practices. However, courts need to exercise
some care, since article VII(l) is not limited only to issues relating to article 11(2).289
Blanket adoption of the second element of the UNCITRAL Recommendation might
have repercussions beyond form requirements unless courts expressly limit their
holdings to issues relating to article II(2).290
Of course, some judges might decide that they want to utilize article VII(1)
in a more comprehensive manner.29' That is perfectly acceptable as a matter of
international law, although it is important to recall that article VII(1) is only
applicable to those provisions of national law that are more liberal than the New
York Convention is with respect to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards.292 Article VII(1) cannot be relied upon to give effect to national laws that
reflect standards of enforcement that are more restrictive than those found in the
New York Convention.293
Although article VII(l) has not been used extensively by U.S. courts in the
past, adoption of this portion of the UNCITRAL Recommendation does not
constitute a radical change from current practice.294 Instead, it simply provides an
internationally sound basis for relying on domestic law. Courts are already
applying aspects of domestic U.S. law to disputes arising under the New York
Convention, although the judges' rationales for doing so often differ from case to
case.295  The current approach therefore leads to inconsistencies of practice and
286 See UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14; see also supra notes 273-76 and
accompanying text.
287 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516
U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
288 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra
note 14; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text.
289 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(l); UNCITRAL Recommendation,
supra note 14.
290 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(1); UNCITRAL Recommendation,
supra note 14.
291 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1).
292 See id.
293 See id.; Lander Co. v. MMP Inv., Inc., 107 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1997) (correctly applying
article VII(1) and approving "overlapping coverage" between the FAA and the New York Convention
pursuant to article VII). But see Kailroy Produce Co. v. Pac. Tomato Growers, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d
1036, 1040 (D.C. Ariz. 2010) (incorrectly applying article VII(l) and using it to rely on domestic law
that was less favorable to a party seeking to enforce an arbitral award).
294 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1); UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra
note 14; see also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
295 See New York Convention, supra note 1. Currently, a court may apply domestic U.S. law to
issues relating to form requirements under the New York Convention because (1) the court believes that
it is permitted or required to do so by sections 202 or 208 of the FAA; (2) the court fails to appreciate
how international legal standards apply to the question at bar; or (3) the court is attempting to
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outcome that are contrary to the enunciated purposes of the New York
Convention.296
A good deal of confusion could be eliminated through explicit reliance on
domestic law via article VII(l) of the Convention.297 If nothing else, problems
associated with the need for a "signed" writing would disappear, since section 2 of
the FAA does not require signatures.2 98 This would put the United States more in
line with international commercial practice, which is also seeing a decreased
299
reliance on signatures in the formal sense.
This approach is also acceptable to the international legal order, since its
methodology is consistent with both the explicit terms of the New York Convention
and existing international legal practices.3 00 Indeed, numerous national courts have
already adopted this approach to article VII(1) so as to be able to interpret form
requirements by reference to more favorable national law.30'
Finally, adopting this second portion of the UNCITRAL Recommendation
does not in any way violate the concept of consent as being at the core of
arbitration.302  Even though the signature requirement would be omitted, for
example, courts would still need to find that an agreement to arbitrate existed.303
That is not to say that this approach is free of all problems. For example,
U.S. case law is already subject to confusion and circuit splits, even with respect to
the simpler requirements under section 2 of the FAA.3" Increasing the opportunity
for diversity may not be wise, given the need for predictability and consistency in
this area of law. Widespread reliance on article VII(1) by U.S. courts could also
lead to difficulties at the time of enforcement if judges in the United States were to
compel arbitration of a wider range of disputes than would be enforceable in other
states. 305 However, concerns of this type were not enough to stop UNCITRAL from
enacting the Recommendation and therefore should not stand in the way of the
United States' judicious use of article VII(1) in cases involving form
requirements.306
harmonize domestic and international law. See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202, 208 (2011); see also supra notes 69-172 and accompanying text.
296 See New York Convention, supra note 1; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520
n.15 (1974); Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1300 (1 Ith Cir. 2005).
297 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VI l(1).
298 See id art. 11(2); 9 U.S.C. § 2; BORN, supra note 7, at 608 (noting multiple cases holding that
tacit acceptance of an unsigned arbitration agreement or exchange of documents is permitted in
domestic disputes arising under section 2 of the FAA).
299 See BORN, supra note 7, at 617; see also Compagnie de Nay. et Transports S.A. v.
Mediterranean Shipping Co., XXI Y.B. COMM. ARB. 690, 697 (Swiss Fed. Trib., 1996) (noting "with
the development of modem means of communication, unsigned written documents have an increasing
importance and diffusion, [such] that the need for a signature inevitably diminishes, especially in
international commerce").
300 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l).
301 See id. arts. 11(2), VII(l); BORN, supra note 7, at 541-42; di Pietro, supra note 7, at 447.
302 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
303 See BORN, supra note 7, at 618; see supra note 284 and accompanying text.
304 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011); BORN, supra note 7, at 608 (discussing
domestic case law).
305 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1); Landau, supra note 7, at 51.
306 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l); SG Report, supra note 13, 8; see also
supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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C. Adoption ofArticle 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law
The third and final proposal for resolving the problems associated with
form requirements in disputes arising under the New York Convention focuses
more on legislative rather than judicial action. Essentially, Congress could
eliminate many of the existing difficulties by replacing existing legislation
concerning form requirements for arbitration with some version of article 7 of the
Model Arbitration Law.0o
This is perhaps the most expansive response to the problems associated
with form requirements, but it does have the benefit of addressing the situation in a
consistent and comprehensive manner rather than relying on piecemeal resolution
through the courts. This is not to say that judges would not need to be involved in
this type of reform measure, since the courts would still need to give effect to these
new provisions of domestic law through article VII(l) of the New York
Convention, but the courts would have a much clearer indication of the standards
that they should apply to any particular dispute if Congress were to adopt some
form of the revised Model Arbitration Law.3 08
UNCITRAL proposed two different versions of article 7 of the Model
Arbitration Law, with Option 2 being much more broad-reaching than Option 1. 3
Indeed, Option 2 eliminates the writing requirement altogether."o
Option 2 is the better of the two options and is the alternative
recommended herein for adoption in the United States. However, commentators
have also remarked favorably on Option I.'" The full text of Option I of the Model
Arbitration Law is reproduced above,3 2 but several provisions should be noted here
as being particularly useful.
First, article 7(3) of Option I states that "[a]n arbitration agreement is in
writing if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration
agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means."313
This provision is helpful because it identifies the variety of ways in which an
agreement to arbitrate may be made and distinguishes issues relating to the creation
of an agreement to arbitrate from the ways in which the contents of the agreement
may be demonstrated. As such, this language meets the needs of those who believe
a writing is primarily necessary to demonstrate the content of an arbitration
agreement rather than consent to such an agreement.314
Although article 7(3) should be central to any legislative reform
contemplated by Congress, article 7 contains other useful suggestions as well. For
307 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202; Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
308 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(1); Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 77.
3 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
310 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7, Option 2; Costello, supra note 243, at 147.
311 See Kucherepa, supra note 7, at 425; Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 75-78. Indeed, some
states have already adopted this alternative. See Kim M. Rooney, The New Hong Kong Arbitration
Law, 16 IBA ARB. NEWS 51, 53 (Mar. 2011).
312 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
3 Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
314 See Landau, supra note 7, at 20-23 (noting the two functions of the writing requirement are to
prove consent and to prove content); Schramm et al., supra note 7, at 74 (noting UNCITRAL's view
that the writing requirement is meant to demonstrate content, not consent).
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example, articles 7(4), 7(5) and 7(6) of Option 1 provide further examples of the
ways in which the writing requirement can be met."' Technical innovations are
discussed in section (4), waiver arguments are addressed in section (5) and
incorporation by reference is covered in section (6)."' Although incorporation of
any or all of these provisions into a revised FAA would doubtless reduce confusion
and hence litigation, many of these issues have already been addressed in the
United States, at least to some extent, through case law."' That is not to say that
statutory guidance would not be beneficial, but simply to note that subsection (3) is
a critical addition to any reform measure, while subsections (4) through (6) are
merely helpful."
Although Congress can act with somewhat more freedom than can courts,
it still must take care that any reforms in the area of international commercial
arbitration comply with the United States' treaty obligations under the New York
Convention.' In adopting the 2006 version of the Model Arbitration Law, in
whole or in part, Congress would obviously be on very safe ground.3 20 Not only
was the Model Arbitration Law drafted by UNCITRAL itself, but UNCITRAL
specifically stated in 2005 that "the wide adoption by States" of the revised version
of article 7 of the Model Arbitration Law "could provide a useful means of
achieving greater uniformity as to the form requirement [of the New York
Convention], which [would be] more responsive to the needs of modem
arbitration."3 2 Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has recognized
that the Model Arbitration Law's revised approach to form requirements was not
only "the subject of due deliberation and extensive consultations with Governments
and interested circles," but that it "would contribute significantly to the
establishment of a harmonized legal framework for a fair and efficient settlement of
international commercial disputes," thus fulfilling the purposes of the New York
Convention.3 2   Therefore, congressional efforts to adopt article 7 of the Model
Arbitration Law would comply with the United States' international obligations.323
315 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7. Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the revised
Model Arbitration Law essentially reiterate the current U.S. approach to form requirements. See id. art.
7(1)-(2); BORN, supra note 7, at 607-09. As such, articles 7(1) and 7(2) are therefore largely
uncontroversial.
See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
3 See BORN, supra note 7, at 607-09.
318 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art.
7.
319 See New York Convention, supra note 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the most
recently enacted provision will control in cases of conflict between federal legislation and non-self-
executing international treaties. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). However, the
Supreme Court recognized that there is nevertheless an international obligation "to avoid hostile
legislation" concerning the subject of the treaty. Id. at 193. Therefore, although Congress may act as it
pleases, it should bear in mind duties imposed on the United States by an international treaty. This is
particularly appropriate where, as here, the purpose of the legislative enactment is to give further and
better effect to the purposes and provisions of an international treaty.
320 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
321 UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 1 36; see also New York Convention, supra note 1, art.
11(2); Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
322 General Assembly Resolution, supra note 239; see also New York Convention, supra note 1;
Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175.
323 See Model Arbitration Law, supra note 175, art. 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion shows, the United States' current approach to
the interpretation and application of the form requirements of the New York
Convention is problematic at both the national and international levels.32 4 Not only
is the existing state of affairs contrary to the purposes and policies of both the New
York Convention and U.S. law, it is also completely unnecessary.325
International commercial and arbitral practice has advanced to a sufficient
stage of sophistication that a highly technical form requirement is no longer needed.
Archaic form requirements hinder international commerce and arbitration by (1)
reducing the number of disputes that can be sent to arbitration or the awards that
can be enforced internationally and (2) decreasing the predictability that is at the
cornerstone of efficient international trade. 326
A large number of states have already restricted the need for written form
requirements so as to meet the evolving demands of the international business
community.3 27 While the United States also reflects this more liberal approach from
time to time, there is no consistency in how U.S. courts address this issue.3 28
However, recent developments have created an environment that is ripe for
change.3 29 Three different routes to reform are possible: judicial adoption of an
expansive reading of article 11(2) of the New York Convention; judicial recognition
of article VII(1) of the Convention as a means of relying on more favorable
provisions of national law found in section 2 of the FAA; and congressional
adoption of article 7 of the 2006 version of the Model Arbitration Law, in whole or
in part, in conjunction with judicial reliance on article VIl(l) of the New York
Convention so as to give international effect to the new provisions of national
law.330 Any one of these approaches would result in the dual benefit of (1)
minimizing or even eliminating much of the domestic litigation about the existence
and scope of form requirements under the New York Convention and (2) bringing
the United States into closer conformity with international legal and commercial
norms."' Now all that is left to be seen is which of the various alternatives the
United States will adopt.
324 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
325 See New York Convention, supra note 1; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538 (1995); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974).
326 See generally BORN, supra note 7, at 606.
327 See id at 617; see also UNCITRAL Note, supra note 12, 136.
328 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202
(2011); see also supra notes 23-172 and accompanying text.
329 See New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2); General Assembly Resolution, supra note
239; UNCITRAL Recommendation, supra note 14.
330 See New York Convention, supra note 1, arts. 11(2), VII(1); Model Arbitration Law, supra
note 175, art. 7; see also supra notes 250-327 and accompanying text.
331 See New York Convention, supra note 1.
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